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DEDICATION
To landless peasants of Brazil
Dr. Stockmann: It is the majority in our community that denies me my freedom
and seeks to prevent my speaking the truth.
Hovstad: The majority always has right on its side.
Billing: And truth too, by God!
Dr. Stockmann: The majority never has right on its side. Never I say! That is
one of those social lies against which an independent, intelligent man must wage
war. Who is it that constitute the majority of the population in a country? Is
it the clever folk or the stupid? I don’t imagine you will dispute the fact that
at present the stupid people are in an absolutely overwhelming majority all the
world over. But, good Lord!–You can never pretend that it is right that the stupid
folk should govern the clever ones! [the crowd cries out] Oh yes–you can shout
me down, I know! But you cannot answer me. The majority has might on its
side-unfortunately; but right it has not. I am in the right–I and a few other
scattered individuals. The minority is always in the right.
Henrik Ibsen in An Enemy of the People,1882
See Act IV in Ibsen and McFarlane (1999)
Acknowledgment
Soon I’ll find the right words, they’ll be very simple.
–Jack Kerouac in Some of the Dharma (1997)
On Sunday, April 9, 2017: Members of the Alvimar Ribeiro Camp were received by
gunmen at the headquarters of Fazenda Norte Ame´rica, in Captain Eneias-Minas
Gerais. MST activists were headed to a meeting at about 7:30 am called by the farm
administrator when they were surprised by several jaguncos. The wounded reported
that the landlord himself was driving his Hilux while the gunmen fired continuously
from the top of the body. The incident occurred when approximately 300 unarmed
people were walking towards administrator house. In late April,2017, I traveled to Belo
Horizonte, Minas Gerais to meet some my friends who observed the incident, the one
described on April,9 and many before and after it. While working on this dissertation,
I visited two camp sites, observing, talking and listening to people, activists, unionists,
students and peasants.This dissertation is dedicated to them and many others.
It is with great sincerity, I express a gratitude towards my adviser, Prof. Bastiaan,
he is dedicated scholar and his work has been guide for me from the inception of
this research. He has been keen in my approach, and guided this ambitious work
throughout the time. Prof. Salas and Prof. Leone has guided my research in early
stages of work, and gave me opportunity to work on this topic. Prof. Hugo has an
infectious energy for research that he effortlessly passes on to students. He provided
critical feedback and constant encouragement at crucial moments of this research.
Prof. Santos was generous with his encouragement. Prof. Gori gave a critical direction
and guidance required for novice like me in econometric methods. His guidance is
decisive in this work, in particular and my research, in general. I’m immensely grateful
to all of these amazing teachers.
This dissertation was impossible without my father, Mr. Nivrutti V. Shinde,
nothing in my life is complete until I share it with you. My mother, Mrs. Suman
N. Shinde, your lifelong inspiring work of helping all those in need, has taught me
pensive lessons in life. Before anything in world of social work, you are my school of
social work. I am grateful to both of you, to remind me that, I will fail as being, only if I
stop writing. My sisters, Smita, Madhuri and Meenakshi,thanks for love and support.
Mangesh, for reminding me that only way to have friend is to be one. Poonam, I have
no words to express my gratitude, for making everything possible. Lastly, my niece,
Diya, you amaze me every day. Thank you all.
Diego; thanks for everything, you are true friend in need and deed. James
helped to form a raw database from various resources, and much more. Sunil bhau
gave guidance and motivation to pursue this course. ViKa, Akshaykumar and Vishal
brought wits & critical insights to this work. My colleagues at GLU, thanks for many
discussions and inputs in this work. I would like to thank the faculty and staff at
the NEA, CESIT and IE Library, and general staff members in UNICAMP were always
helpful.
With humble gratitude, I am thankful for scholarship given Central U´nica dos
Trabalhadores (CUT), Brazil for my work and stay in Brazil.
Lastly, I am thankful for our dog, Milio, who was with me, till the end of this work
and, will remain forever.
Nilesh Suman Nilvrutti Shinde,
Campinas, Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil
9.35 PM, May, 28, 2017
Abstract
The agrarian conflicts are central to debates on development in political sciences
and economics. So is the long venerable tradition of research of agrarian conflicts
which is either placed around the land or market question. But there is seldom
research on land (conflicts) and (market) inequality question put together. Much of
this dearth is due to lack of data on exploring possible link between land question to
market i.e. land conflicts and economic inequality.This thesis develops an evidence
based on the framework of the income inequality and land conflict. We propose a
novel method of analyzing a panel data from years 2004 to 2014 for Federal and State
level administrative units in Brazil. The main argument uniquely characterizes a class
of inequality measures with land conflict indicators that fits into broader literature
of conflict and development economics. The analysis demonstrates a patent evidence
that income inequality, measured in varied indices, have significant relation with
land conflicts. Additionally, we provide estimation of vertical as well as horizontal
inequality that suggest evolutionary emergence of income inequality and its impact
on land conflicts. In overall summary, the research demonstrates the land question
as ability of parties to incite a conflict to exploit natural resources depends on
their access to external markets via income inequality. Here, the land (distribution)
hierarchies are closely associated with inequalities, mainly income inequality in
Brazil. The state or non-state agrarian institutions plays crucial role in these conflicts.
The data from third party source i.e. NGO called Comissa˜o Pastoral da Terra (CPT)
besides the government and research institution i.e. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia
e Estatı´stica (IBGE) suggest a complex system of land economy. The land is not only
an important economic asset but also a source of livelihoods; it is also closely linked
to community identity, history and culture. Communities, therefore, can readily
mobilize around land issues, making land a central object of conflict. This leads to
centrality of land in development question. We place the centrality of land in debates
in–space and scarcity–in macro-foundation of micro-conflicts. Our central argument
is twofold, firstly space in terms of land and income exacerbate the schism in society
where one group endows conflict or contest as tool of accumulation. Secondly,
the groups in power are often higher income groups which suggest the colonial
roots of land conflicts. Consequently, research suggests that grievances discourses
as fundamental development goal for emerging economy. Based on extensive data
analysis, the research recommends a price regulation, guaranteed market accesses and
land redistribution as three key steps towards this goal.
Keywords: land conflicts, income inequality, econometric analysis of count data
and Brazil.
Resumo
Os conflitos agra´rios sa˜o fundamentais para debates sobre desenvolvimento em
cieˆncias polı´ticas e economia. Assim e´ a longa e venera´vel tradic¸a˜o de pesquisa
de conflitos agra´rios, que e´ colocada em torno da terra ou questa˜o do mercado.
Mas raramente ha´ pesquisas sobre questo˜es de terra (conflitos) e de desigualdade
(de mercado) colocadas. Grande parte dessa escassez e´ devido a´ falta de dados
sobre a explorac¸a˜o do possı´vel vı´nculo entre a questa˜o da terra para o mercado,
ou seja, conflitos de terras e desigualdades econoˆmicas. Esta tese desenvolve
uma evideˆncia baseada no quadro da desigualdade de renda e conflito de terra.
Propomos um novo me´todo de ana´lise de um painel de dados de 2004 a 2014 para
unidades administrativas federais e estaduais no Brasil. O argumento principal
caracteriza de forma u´nica uma classe de medidas de desigualdade com indicadores
de conflito de terra que se encaixam na literatura mais ampla de conflito e economia
do desenvolvimento. A ana´lise demonstra uma evideˆncia de patente de que a
desigualdade de renda, medida em ı´ndices variados, tem relac¸a˜o significativa com
conflitos de terra. Ale´m disso, fornecemos estimativas de desigualdades verticais
e horizontais que sugerem o surgimento evolutivo da desigualdade de renda e seu
impacto em conflitos de terra. No resumo geral, a pesquisa demonstra a questa˜o
da terra como a capacidade das partes para incitar um conflito a explorar recursos
naturais depende do seu acesso a mercados externos por meio da desigualdade de
renda. Aqui, as hierarquias de terra (distribuic¸a˜o) esta˜o intimamente associadas a
desigualdades, principalmente a desigualdade de renda no Brasil. As instituic¸ o˜es
agra´rias estatais ou na´o estatais desempenham um papel crucial nesses conflitos. Os
dados de uma fonte de terceiros, como a ONG, chamaram de CPT, ale´m do governo e
da instituic¸a˜o de pesquisa, ou seja, o IBGE sugere um sistema complexo de economia
de terra. A terra na˜o e´ apenas um bem econoˆmico importante, mas tambe´m uma fonte
de meios de subsisteˆncia; tambe´m esta´ intimamente ligado a´ identidade, histo´ria e
cultura da comunidade. As comunidades, portanto, podem facilmente se mobilizar
em torno das questo˜es da terra, tornando a terra um objeto central de conflito. Isso
leva a textit centralidade de terra em questa˜o de desenvolvimento. Colocamos a
centralidade da terra em debates no espao e na escassez - em macro-fundac¸a˜o de
micro-conflitos. Nosso argumento central e´ duplo, primeiro o espac¸o em termos de
terra e renda exacerba o cisma na sociedade, onde um grupo da´ conflito ou competic¸a˜o
como ferramenta de acumulac¸a˜o. Em segundo lugar, os grupos no poder sa˜o muitas
vezes grupos de renda mais elevados que sugerem as razes coloniais dos conflitos de
terra. Consequentemente, a pesquisa sugere que as queixas discordam como meta
de desenvolvimento textit fundamental para a economia emergente. Com base em
extensas ana´lises de dados, a pesquisa recomenda um regulamento de preos, acesso
garantido ao mercado e redistribuic¸ a˜o de terras como treˆs passos principais para este
objetivo.
Keywords: conflitos de terra, desigualdade de renda, ana´lise econome´trica de
dados de contagem e Brasil.
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–On Method of Dialectics–
If I had any proposition (pratijna), then this defect (doya) would be mine. I have,
however, no proposition (nasti ca mama pratijna). Therefore, there is no defect
that is mine (tasman naivasti me doyah). If I had any proposition, then the defect
previously stated by you would be mine, because it would affect the specific character
of my proposition (mama pratijnalakyanapraptatvat). [But] I have no proposition.
Thus [we observe:] When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature
isolated, how can there be a proposition ? How can something affect the specific
character of a proposition (kutah pratijnalakyanapraptih)? [And] how can there be a
defect, caused by the fact of affecting the specific character of a proposition (kutah
pratijhalakyanapraptikrto doyah)? In these circumstances, your statement: ’the defect
is only yours because it affects the specific character of your proposition’, is not valid.
–Nagarjuna on Dialectical method of knowledge (Lindtner, 1987)
–On Statistics and Truth–
He who accepts statistics indiscriminately will often be duped unnecessarily. But he
who distrusts statistics indiscriminately will often be ignorant unnecessarily.
–Professor C. Radhakrishna Rao on Statistics and Truth in (Rao, 1997)
18
Chapter 1
Scarcity of Space: theorizing
Land-Conflict nexus in Brazil
Abstract
The prominence of disputes over land has led to easy labeling of related conflict
as the land conflict. Despite such seemingly clear relationships between land and
violent conflict, question remains about the precise relationship of interest (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008) between two categories. Albeit, there are numerous anecdotal evidence
for the claim that land may be an important source or driver of conflict. However,
rolling in some notable exception such as Grossman and Kim (1996); Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) and Esteban and Ray (2008), to date no statistically significant direct
causal relationship has been found between land distribution, (income) polarization,
or categorical inequality in land ownership and the outbreak of civil war or internal
strifes (Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar, 2016). Note that, significant research on
resource economics has either averting or adopting the broader historical notion
that land–labor–capital as dynamic drivers in macro-economy but to explore concrete
micro-foundation of these drivers in terms of inequality, prices and so on we have,
hitherto, fell short. This dissertation initiates the debate on these fault lines where
the land–conflict nexus is defined and studied, in dual sense, firstly to deconstruct the
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notion of conflicts in land–in–development and secondly, to deliberate a notion land
in conflicts, to be understood and explored in this dissertation. We begin from the
North (1990) that weak institutions are strongly associated with under-development,
here, in economic models of conflict (See (North et al., 2005); Esteban and Ray
(1999); Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014)) outbreaks of
violence require a prize that is both valuable and contestable. The landed property and
proprietorship, in Brazilian agrarian economy, operates as valuable in dual sense, first
as space of macro-politics over titles (via social movements) and second as space of
macro-economic competition (via land market). The contestable of a (landed) prize
is deeply ingrained in the social structures (land-accumulation and then dislocation
and dispossession). This Chapter 1 suggests a broader framework on land conflicts
to open up debate on the income inequality and land–conflicts as complex system of
macro–history of Brazil.
Keywords: land, conflicts, nexus, elements of conflicts, space, scarcity and
econometric analysis
1.1 Introduction
Na˜o e´ um livro apenas, sa˜o histo´rias de vida,
sa˜o histo´rias de pessoas, Na˜o pedemos esquecer isso1
-Dom Leonardo Steiner2
The debates over land conflicts are predominant in conflict studies, but precise
relationship between the land–conflict nexus; yet provokes some key questions.
Beginning from classical political economic debates on property (See Locke and Laslett
(1988); Smith (2005); Marx and Works (1936c) and Marx (1993)), the subjects of the
1Read in English: They are not just a book, they are life histories,(they) are stories of people, we do
not ask to forget this.
2Secreta´rio geral da CNBB3 at Conflitos no Compo Brasil, 2016
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political ecology and social anthropology have aptly covered framework centering on
the scarcity and institutional failure (Some key readings are von Benda-Beckmann
et al. (2006); Boone (2012); Boone (2007); Lund (2011); Wolford (2015); and Ostrom
(2015)). In political science and economics, the focus has been on institutional but
the public goods perspective Alesina and Rodrik (1991), Ray (2010) alongside a
remarkable thesis of Olson (1989) and North (1990). These scholars brought up the
scarcity–allocation perspective Bardhan (1991) and more recently by Esteban and Ray
(1999), Mayoral and Ray (2015) and Ray and Esteban (2017). While underlining
the contribution of these critical approaches, we argue that questions about what
is actually at stake in so-called land–conflicts, and in particular how localized
land disputes and large-scale violence get nested in micro-economic foundations of
macroeconomic, are not yet adequately addressed. To further theorizing on this point
the chapter proposes to take on board advances made in the wider field of conflict
studies, notably the notions of scarcity as a social space in conflicts and grievances under
high incidences of (wealth and income) inequality. We emphasize the relationship of
interest among the variables, land–conflicts and income inequality. Doing this, we
argue that the importance of alliances between local disputes and macro-economic
cleavages such as income polarization, and of processes of predation and production.
The added value of such a perspective is then illustrated by in-depth analysis of
Brazilian land conflicts that bring out how sense-making of social actors at different
levels, including development intervener, interlocks through alliances and framing
Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar (2016).
We suggest that academic research shall analyze how a particular land–related
conflicts are operationalized, stimulated, interpreted and utilized in complex
economic system. Following Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar (2016) that
policy-makers and development practitioners should be aware that their work is
not neutral, and should be more attentive to how their programs feed into processes
of sense-making and mobilization. The aim of this Chapter 1 is to de-link the
land–conflict as nomenclature while proposing a dynamic, non-linear and adoptive
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notion of land conflict analysis into realm of social research. The following Chapter 2
imitates this aim, doing two distinct macro-analysis of land conflicts in Brazil.
What is Land conflict?
We understand land conflict, mainly from definitions of CPT’s (Comissa˜o Pastoral da
Terra) annual publication on Conflitos no Campo Brasil 2016, where Land conflicts are
defined as the conflicts by/on land are actions of resistance and coping for possession,
use and ownership of land and access to resources.
Such as: rubber groves, or chestnuts, among others (which guarantee the right to
extractivism), when involving squatters, settlers, quilombolas, indigenous peoples,
small tenants, peasants, occupants, (who are) without land, rubber tappers, peasants
(at) the bottom of pasture, babau coconut breakers,chestnut trees(harvester),
faxinalenses, etc.
The occupations and the camps are also classified in the category of conflicts by/on
land4.
Flowchart (1): outline of research gives an algorithm of this dissertation. We begin
with broader–to–specific research questions. The broad question of land in conflicts
gets transformed into precise question of inequality, market prices and violence5. Each
of these variables carries enormous literature together with umbrella term of the land
conflicts. In following sections of this Chapter, we take overview of contemporary
literature of conflict studies. The flowchart shows that, we began with (unbiased)
premise that whither land–conflict nexus?, doing this, we conceive that, in theory,
there are elements of conflicts on the lines of class, caste, gender, linguistic and
regional grouping. Thus, it is necessary to obtain a precise parametric narrative.6 In
4Please refer https://www.cptnacional.org.br/
5Consider that incidence of conflict is driven by endogenous and exogenous variables, however for
the sake of our objective, we argue that endogenous component may be considerably significant.
6The drive for parametric narrative is experimental in econometric inquiry, indeed a non-parametric
inquiry is more comprehensive. Please refer Stigum (2015).
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political economic terms to explore conflict. We choose to narrow down our focus on
inequality–conflict framework, where there are two research objectives, based three
theoretical paradigms inter-connected with each other. The dissertation concludes an
analysis section as macro-foundational notion of conflict in local versus global land
economy.
CHAPTER 1. SCARCITY OF SPACE 23
1.2 Outline of research
Introduction
Research on
land+conflict nexus
Elements of conflicts
Income inequality
and conflict
(Land) prices
and conflicts
Production, Predation
and Property
Income polarisation
and conflict
Social distance
and Prices
Macro-foundations
of land economy
Land conflict as
spill-over in
micro-economy
Conclusion
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1.3 Space, Scarcity and Conflicts
Social space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among
other products: rather it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their
interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity - their (relative)
order and/or (relative) disorder.
–Lefebvre (1991) on social space
Social space is intuitive in the classical political economy, both as objective inquiry as
well as subjective demonstration of scientific inquiry. We observe that the notion of
space is political in Hegelian method, inherited by Marx and Works (1936a) for that
the space is momenta in the capital. Where consider Marx’s notion of space derives its
meaning from time in and of capital. He elaborates that ’the second moment is the
space of time running from the completed transformation of capital into the product
until when it becomes transformed into money. The frequency with which capital can
repeat the production process, self-realization, in a given amount of time, evidently
depends on the speed with which this space of time is run through, or on its duration
Marx (1993)[emphasis added]’. Note that, space is dual, first it is for transformation of
capital and second it is of the transformation. A composite of space in Marx’s notion
gets refined in frequency (i.e. temporal space) of capital movement, to be realized in
movement of capital. Thus, the space in Marx’s corpus work is a relational, a dynamic
and an enthrone of whole of the capital (or capitalist) organization. However, what is
remarkable about this notion is the focus on repetitive (yet seemingly non-mundane)
nature of capitalist production and self-realization process in given amount of time. We
argue that the objective research on space shall delve into inquiry of space in temporal
as well as geographical breadths.
On the note of space beyond geography, we arrive in Lefebvre’s notion of the
social space Lefebvre (1991), later defined in Harvey (2006) as the space of justice. We
suggest a notion of scarcity applied in space as the compound argument of economic
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scarcity transforming the capital in formation of space and vice versa. This is space
of categorical political and economic system in given society at given time. Albeit, the
notion of space has to be realized as dynamic against time, therefore for research on
space a temporal specificity is crucial for any research, we consider it in more details in
Chapter 2. Here, lets focus on notion of space with scarcity, in Bardhan (2005) the logic
of scarcity is about securing property rights and resolving coordination failures. This,
aptly, brings a micro-economic notion of scarcity to macro-political failure, where
the structural basis of power; institutions and their accountability derives unequal
evolution of development via income inequality. Scarcity of space is compound notion
of decentralization of national income and centralization of resources; devolution of
power and accretion of regime. It is the notion of private bargain on public resources.
In this thesis, we present an elementary view of scarcity of space where income
(and wealth) distributional inequalities induces (landed) violent conflict. We suggest
that scarcity amidst the abundant land resources is apt description of Brazilian power
structure, and therefore of contemporary land conflict. Figure 1.1 shows a recursive
argument of thesis; we suggest that there are two types of conflicts in landed property
relations. Firstly, individual agents and state exhibits a denotative conflict which is
formation of land rights versus tenure. Since, consolidation of Brazilian agrarian
governance structure, the land documentation or record has been point of contention
between individual as well as collectives agencies. These have repeatedly resulted into
land conflict or contest. Reydon et al. (2015) gives a succinct account of these agents
involved in violent and non-violent contest where the land violence has been causal
model of consternation over transaction and access to and of the market. Secondly,
we observe that there is long-term, consistent and often violent latent conflict between
non-state and state actors in society. Wolford (2015) gives a contemporary account
of non-state actors in rural economy of Brazil. Alston et al. (2000) suggest that
non-state actors are major power agencies in agrarian market, where the violent means
of extraction and control of wealth is commonplace.
In this thesis, we give a constructive argument on land conflict to be linked with
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macro-economic structure of inequalities in Brazil. Keeping, Figure 1.1 in mind that
change in social structure and state operationalize a complex system of land economy
in Brazil. We, however, present an overview of it, employing a specific objective of
demonstration of relation between land conflict and income inequality. Following
section sets out a specific context of our research.
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Outline
1.4 Propertylessness, Predation and Production: context
of research
Exchange of labor for labor rests on the worker’s propertylessness
-Marx on propertylessness Marx (1993)
That wealth ... which always follows the improvements of agriculture
and manufacture ... provokes the invasion of all their neighbours. An
industrious, and upon that account a wealthy nation, is of all nations the
most likely to be attacked(...).
-Smith on agrarian nationsSmith (2005)
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The history of Brazil, [if] once to be surmised in a line, would be aptly put forth by
Marxian datum that exchange of labor for labour rests on the workers propertylessness
(Marx, 1993). Since, Brazil was founded on the notion of property and proprietorship
of land, beginning as discovery of land (and landed resources) (Alden, 1973) to be
concertized in a violent appropriation of land from Native Americans and then
to overarching practice of the Afro-Brazilian slavery in Portuguese colonization of
so called the new world (Fausto and Fausto, 2014). Landed property (as well as
proprietorship) has been a point of departure of Brazil’s macro-history. However, both
the manner and meaning of landed property dynamically changed over centuries, albeit
the land remains the origin of exploitation and expropriation, which is congenial
to a policy of egalitarian redistribution. Here, the claim with which it is easily
conjoined, to form, that labor is sole source of value, can be made to serve in-egalitarian
ends7. In Brazil, last four decade of social-economic upheaval has, in fact, persisted
into in-egalitarian ends, mainly in terms of concentrated land–holdings and income
concentrations (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).
In a classic work, Alston et al. (1999b) studied a multi-principal, multi-task model
of interest group behavior to examine how groups with so called limited resources. The
threat and practice of appropriation by big–landowners leads to more land invasions,
as we observe in Alston et al. (1999a) a model of title i.e. land rights formation in align
with big–business, rich and urban owners violently jettisoning landless workers from
their claims. Moreover, the reigning threat of expropriation by state or non–state actors
leads to inefficiently low investment in resource i.e. land in contest-station or disputes.
Besley (1995) Besley and Ghatak (2009) suggests that the authoritarian character of the
inefficiently high investment in guard of the labor. North et al. (2005) and Acemoglu
et al. (2005) demonstrates how, the state, if fails to develop a monopoly on control, then
the weak property rights may lead to civil conflict. In weak institutions via property
rights (and parliament system) the contest for resources lead into conflict for control
vis–a´–vis ownership of means of productions. For example, in Bogart and Richardson
7Cohen (1995) explores a historical condition of seeing labour as sole source of value as departure
from Marx (1867) notion of labor theory of value.
28
(2011), we observe that how British parliament evolved during industrialization in
last two centuries, Parliament operated a forum where rights to land and resources
could be reorganized. This summarizing a continuing and dynamic nature of property
in Briton, from the common law of industrial torts and Parliaments policies towards
lighthouses8 In Brazil, however, Borras (2003); Deininger and Byerlee (2012) and
Reydon et al. (2015) suggest that the weak property rights and public institutions
resulted into an economic model, for conflict to be profitable via two conditions. First,
there must be something worth taking–the prize must be valuable9. Second, it must
be possible to take it–the prize must be contestable10. For any civil conflict, the second
condition captures the ability of state to enforce and protect property rights.
The second condition for conflict can be also seen as positive opportunity cost
of predation. But before we begin debate on predation, lets first understand the
nature of land conflicts in Brazil. Land and land–related conflict in Brazil has varied
forms, as it operates as both collective and individual violence11. But, if one has
to identify its primary character, then it is often cited as land invasions by poor
landless peasants to unoccupied or uncharted large–estate holdings. Here, we take
land invasion as prima facie case of land conflict, assuming that all other characteristic
of land-conflicts are subsumed under broader category of land invasions. Doing this,
we have objective to establish a notion that land invasion to be seen in framework
of predation and production to be studied further in macro-economic understanding
of income inequality and macro-politics of land based violence. Note that, we insist
that seeing land conflicts in broader development and agrarian question of Brazil
is need in around. Conflict is formed by the set of conflicts that, if resolved lead
8The lighthouse is emblem of welfare state, as we read Miliband (1983), we suggest the lighthouse
is the way capitalist state maneuver into territory of eminent domain over territory, security and
population. Coase (1974) employs this terminology as he argues that the British system of dynamic
evolution of property rights has been a flexible and hence efficient.
9Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) shows how a lower (opportunity) cost
of conflict is the flip side of a bigger prize, and would be expected to have the same effect
10Contest over rights such as titles(Alston et al., 1999b), occupation (Wolford, 2010) and property
rights (Reydon et al., 2014). In models of conflict as contest functions ( see Grossman (1991); Skaperdas
(1992); Hirshleifer (1995) and Fearon (2008)), incontestability would speak to the mapping of conflict
effort into success.
11See Alston et al. (2000);Wolford (2003a);Wolford (2004);Fernandes (2005);Sullivan (2013) ?
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to development (Galtung, 2000). In such a method, conflicts may be inherent in
development, however it does not mean they are inevitable. In fact, conflict in Brazil
is a result of directly contested resources between the territory of the peasantry, the
latifundia and agribusiness. Reydon (2011b) argues that in land governance disputes
the difference of interest between these territories may come from governmental
solution, albeit one has to include diverse concerns and strategies, GIRARDI and
FERNANDES (2009) suggests that the conflict is not synonymous with violence.
Conflict is a creative action for the transformation of society and violence is a reaction
to the conflict, characterized by physical or moral destruction is the dis-articulation
of conflict through social control. Violence tries to end the conflict without solving
the problems and therefore sticks to development. Land occupations, encampments,
defense of interests with parliament and government are forms of conflict. Murders,
death threats, evictions from the land, and much more, brings us to solutions beyond
land governance approach, we have to direct the grievance addressable mechanism in
land economy of Brazil.
Violence can be direct or indirect, active or passive. Direct violence is the
physical violence employed against the person, against the occupation and against
peasant possession. It may be triggered by private individuals or by the state and
consists mainly of murders, assassination attempts, death threats, land evictions and
other forms of physical or psychological harm to rural workers and peasants or their
property. The assassination attempts, death threats and land evictions are forms
of private violence against peasants. In direct and active violence, the State acts
mainly with judicial evictions and with the use of the police force in the execution
of eviction orders and in the dissipation of demonstrations, which results in deaths
and injuries. The passive form of direct violence occurs with the omission of the State
in relation to the direct violence practiced by private individuals against the peasants.
Indirect violence is a simultaneous practice of the State, Farmers and entrepreneurs.
Political action is the main form of execution of this violence. Promoting lobbies and
being part of the executive, judiciary and especially in the legislature, farmers and
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entrepreneurs influence decisions that involve issues related to the agrarian question.
The criminalization of the struggle for land is another example of indirect violence
against peasants, which can generate forms of direct violence in their fulfilment.
We analyze in this research that the main forms of direct violence against peasants
and rural workers. This violence occurs in parallel to the highly productive agriculture
that characterizes agribusiness and therefore configures what Oliveira and Marquis
(2002) calls barbarism of modernity. The Pastoral Land Commission (i.e. CPT)
documents since the 1980s the occurrences of conflicts and violence in the Brazilian
countryside, the data of which have been published since 1984 in the Conflict in the
Field Notebook. Parallel to the data, Pastoral ministry linked to the Catholic Church
also publishes manifestoes and reports of various cases of violence against the person,
possession and ownership of peasants and rural workers. The reports and photos
depicting barbarism in the Brazilian countryside show a poor population, subjected to
all kinds of deprivation and exploitation provoked by human ambition in the absence
of the State. In this sense, CPT publications allow the most sensitive contact with this
reality and makes us better understand the data. More than numbers, The data of the
CPT are information on the situation of the men and women of the field and portray
the struggle of the Brazilian peasants and the violence suffered by them. Certainly
these data do not cover the whole, but they comprise a significant part of reality,
whose totality is even more violent and unequal. More than figures, numbers must
be understood as lives. More than points, lines and areas, Maps must be read as a
representation of the struggle for land and violence suffered by peasants and workers
in the countryside. They represent families who are homeless, without food and
without water. What we do is to encode some elements of the violent reality of the
Brazilian countryside in order to make its apprehension possible in several ways; Is
to make it possible to measure and scale the violence suffered by peasants in order to
study it and thus contribute to changing this reality.
However, the question of contest and conflict over landed resource, one must
heed to lighthouse of economics i.e. the crisis of inequality. Inequality in dual
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sense, first of wealth and then of income. Piketty and Saez (2006); Collier and
Hoeffler (2004); Fearon and Laitin (2003) and many others consider the inequality
as ruse of conflict. In Brazil, the inequality persists on high scales, to be seen
in details in Chapter 2. However, we consider to focus on economic agents with
highly unequal resource allocation results into a dynamic, adoptive and heterogeneous
production process. Grossman and Kim (1996) develops a static model on how the
interdependence between the evolution of the stock of resources and the evolution
of the allocation of resources among four basic activities: consumption, investment,
predation, and defense against predation. Considering the Brazilian agrarian economy,
this dissertation reads the land resource–in consumption, investment, predation and
defense against predation as complex agrarian economy, where conflicts in terms
of competition and contest often spill-over into violent outbreaks in murders, riots,
abductions and so on12. Note that, in political economic terms, competition or contest
are foundation to macro-economic activity, however, it becomes contentious, by itself,
whence the violent spill-over cross-over the invested means of production. Production
and predation, by means of violent spill-overs, operates such that the wealth of the
prey and the wealth of the potential predator grows or shrinks and conditions under
which the wealth distribution between the prey and the potential predator diverges or
converges. Thus, Grossman and Kim (1996) suggests a relationship of interest between
the wealth distribution and predatory nature of production.
In a economic model of predation, the appropriation occurs by way of one-side
predatory activities, here, we often see the predation leds to violent conflicts, however,
in Grossman and Kim (1996) and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2008) we observe that
how the potential predator allocates its resource endowment between–predation and
production–depends on how effective the offence of the potential predator is against
the defence of the prey, how destructive predation is, and how rich the prey is relative
to the potential predator. The model suggests an explanation for the behaviour of
potential predators, who can live by plundering, by producing consumables, or both.
12See Section: Meaning of conflict: contradictions and incompatibility
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Figure 1.2: Three regions of equilibrium of
the Predation and Production Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2008)[p.66]
In figure 1.2, we observe the relationship between the type of equilibrium that
obtains and the parameters and initial endowments. In which we observe that, if and
only if, the initial endowment of the prey (big landowners) is sufficiently large relative
to the initial endowment of the potential predator and θ is neither too large nor too
small, then the potential predator allocates all its resources to offensive weapons and
the equilibrium is pure predation. Note that, even if the prey is very rich relative to
the predator, a value of θ that is either too large or too small rules out this equilibrium
of pure predation. If θ is too large, then the offensive weapons of the predator are
so effective against the defensive fortifications of the prey that a small allocation of
resources to predation allows the predator to appropriate a large amount of the prey’s
endowment. If θ is too small, then the offensive weapons of the predator are so
ineffective against the defensive fortifications of the prey that allocating much of its
resources to offensive weapons is not worthwhile for the predator (pp. 65-66).
However, in our study of land concentration as initial endowment is, firstly
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invokes a question of original condition of inequality then that of conflict. We
argue that land or income inequalities imitates each other, which gives a research on
exploring income inequality in dynamic of figure 1.2 where predator violence is ends,
and not means of cyclic violence. Note that, Banerjee et al. (2001) and Berman and
Couttenier (2015) demonstrates that equilibrium is ideal situations, however the real
events are almost always violating the conditions. For the purpose of this research,
we should confront the predator violence–in a specific case of predation over land
and production in general–itself, the confrontation must be realized via a concrete,
particulate and functional aspect of predation i.e. income inequality. We demonstrate
the relationship between predation as violent land conflict and production via income
levels as key research objective in following thesis.
1.4.1 Meaning of conflicts: contradictions and incompatibility
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice
that has to be made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which
A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain
A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.
To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has
to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to
harm A?
The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.
Coase (1960) on the Reciprocal Nature of the Problem
Conflict has been subject of enduring literature traditions in many academic
disciplines, here we draw on some highlights. Note that, conflict is seen as pervasive
issue, in this case, to be explored as the land–conflicts. The key works on political
ecology began as far as early works in anthropology, for our view, a key work is Marx’s
less known notebook on anthropology titled The Ethnological Notebook Marx (1974).
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The notebook is collection of Marx’s notes on anthropology where he began rewriting
foundations of commodity and property13. Marx (1974) argued with his contemporary
sociologist and anthropologist on issue of property, as following,
The expression of Plutarch that “the humble and poor readily followed the
summons of Theseus”and the judgement of Aristotle that Theseus “was
inclined toward the people”appear, however, despite Morgan, to indicate
that the chiefs of the gentes etc., through wealth etc. had already reached
a conflict of interest with the common people of the gentes, which is
unavoidably connected through private property in houses, lands, herds
with the monogamous family.
The conflict of interest is amongst fundamental contradiction to Marxian notion
of capitalist production process, we suggest that in Brazil such a conflict of interest
emerges out of multifaceted changes and chores of historical and capitalist mode of
productions. There are six theoretical manifestations of the conflicts of interest where
one can study Brazilian case of conflicts, they are as following,
• Directed technological changes and expectations
In institutional economics, it is commonplace that technology is key driver
of transformations and social change (see Polanyi (2001), Schumpeter and
Backhaus (2003) and Acemoglu (2002)).Drawing on research by psychologists
and sociologists, Gurr (1980) argued that social and political conflict arises
when groups experience feelings of the relative deprivation and the frustration of
expectations for deserved or anticipated economic or social status. Huntington
(1968) called it that modernization raises expectations and mobilizes members
13We suggest that a commodity in its duality is fundamental Marxian Capital while property is
fundamental to commodity, therefore in Marx’s ethnological works he would have focused on property
as key variation of contradictions rather dynamic contradictions of conflicting societies. For instance,
see Althusser and Balibar (1970) affirmation of capital in teleological ends of property; Harvey (2014)
considers landed property as fundamental to capitalist expansion of production, alongside Lefebvre
(1991) space is actualized as landed property.
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of traditional societies towards national politics, contending that conflict occurs
when political institutions lack the capacity to accommodate and manage rapidly
rising demands. Recently, Ray (2006) aspirations and poverty rises together, so
does conflicts. In Brazil, one can explore land economy from dual framework of
directed technological changes and aspirational drives.
• Institutional failure to credibly agree to abstain from violence
Many economists and political scientists see violence as originating from the
commitment problems–as the situations where organized groups have opposing
interests but cannot credibly agree to abstain from violence for a variety of
reasons(Alston et al., 1999b). The focus in these theories is on the difficulty of
groups or individuals in some settings to commit themselves to not using force
when it would be advantageous to do so. This thinking can be traced back as
far as Hobbes (2006), who contended that violent civil conflict is a consequence
of low state capacity to deter challengers and manage conflict among groups in
society. Recent theories on opportunistic arming and consequent violence can be
found in Hirshleifer (1995); Skaperdas (1992); Grossman (1991); and Fearon and
Laitin (2003). Becker (1968) developed a rational actor model of crime. Thinking
on the “security dilemma”-that arming for defense can also be used to attack,
leading to violence-can be traced to Postone (1995) argument of possession of
means of conflicts results into ends as violent conflicts.
• Greed or grievance framework
These contending theories have led to debates over the relative importance
of normative and economic motives for violence(Acemoglu and Wolitzky,
2014), which has recently led to debates on whether economic incentives or
broader social and political motives drive societies to violence. This question
was formulated as Greed and Grievance by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), who
suggested that primary commodities, diasporas, low earnings, human capital,
and dispersed populations were positively correlated to the outbreak of civil
conflict, suggesting support for the greed hypothesis. Further exploration, review
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and critique of these issues can be found in Dube and Vargas (2013),Mitra and
Ray (2014) and Blattman and Miguel (2010). For us in case of Brazil, Lund
(2016) is important guiding study where citizenship surrounds a grievance cycle
in order to restitution property-led violence.
• Horizontal inequality and identity
Significant contributions to this debate include recent theories of polarization
and horizontal inequality and analysis of violence based solely on identity, such
as nationalism and ethnicity(See Esteban and Ray (1999), Esteban and Ray (2007)
and for overview see Ray and Esteban (2017)). Theories of horizontal inequality
as developed by Stewart et al. (2002), and polarization proposed by Esteban and
Ray (2008) argue that inequality alone does not predict civil war-violence may
be driven by relationships between inequality and identity that contribute to the
onset of civil conflicts Collier and Hoeffler (2004). In addition, national or ethnic
identity may lead to a violent response to oppression or marginalization and need
not include any equity concerns, but may be motivated instead by a disposition
in and by government (Povinelli, 2011).
• Ethnic divides and commitment problems
Bridging the arguments on grievance and rational choice motives for
conflict(Skaperdas, 1992), Fearon and Laitin (2003) contends that ethnic
polarization is most likely to precipitate conflict when ethnic groups cannot
make credible commitments to abstain from violence. This is consistent with
the philosophy in this 2011 world bank report which argues that both political
and economic dynamics are often at play, and neither greed nor grievance alone
is sufficient to explain the incidence of violence14.
• Avenues for peaceful contests
In remarkable work of ost, she argues that the question remains: why do some
societies avoid violence(over institutions) when others do not? To answer this
14Please follow https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389
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question, we build on the hypotheses put forward by North et al. (2005), who
shall focus on impersonal institutions with open access to political and economic
opportunities, creating avenues for peaceful and credible contestation (North,
1990). Besley and Persson (2009) contend that investments in legal systems and
state capacity can reduce the incidence of violence. Keefer and Knack (2002)
argues that violence occurs when societies cannot collectively punish leaders who
engage in predatory behavior or collectively build a capable counterinsurgency
force, suggesting that institutionalized political parties serve as a bulwark
against conflict by resolving these problems of collective action and credibility.
Recent empirical quantitative evidence supports these hypotheses-Goldstone
et al. (2010) find that the quality of political institutions is an order of magnitude
more important than other factors in determining risks of political crises and
civil wars, while Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) suggest that institutions are
necessary to accommodate shocks in prices to avoid violence.
Here, besides above six manifestations in theory, we can categorize the land based
conflicts as two types of conflicts, first where the structure such as informal legal
and economic realms acts as conflicting spheres and second where the actors such
as displaced families acts as conflicting agents. In following tree-diagram we observe
that there numerous types of structure and actor based conflicts involved in case of
Brazil. Further, these conflicts has multifaceted social-economic spillovers as listed
Elements of conflicts. We note these down in order grasp the depths and scope of land
conflicts in Brazil. Note that, we have a dual purpose behind such an exercise,one is
to have eclectic base of literature where one can narrow down the objectivity of study
of income inequality in relation with land conflicts. Secondly, we need to divulge into
varied literature to construct a instrumental research options. The notion that one
has to begin with the problem at hand and transcends into problem at present. The
research of this tradition shall be aptly reproducible, thus pragmatic in nature. We
shall further summarize more on this in Chapter 2.
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Elements of land conflicts
1. Potential impact of Land conflicts on Men
(a) Higher rates of morbidity and mortality from group conflicts
(b) Risk of ex-combatants involvement in criminal or illegal activities around
land–occupation and
(c) Difficulties in finding alternative livelihoods
(d) Increasing domestic violence and conflicts
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(e) Higher likelihood to be detained or missing
(f) Increased prevalence of other forms of violence, particularly gender-based
violence: sex-selective massacres; forcibly conscripted or recruited;
subjected to torture, rape, and mutilation; abduction etc.
(g) Higher rates of disability from injury
2. Potential impact of Land conflicts on Women
(a) Higher likelihood to be internally displaced persons and refugees
(b) Reproductive health problems Womens reproductive and care-giving roles
under stress
(c) Sexual and gender-based violence: being subjected to rape, trafficking, and
prostitution; forced pregnancies and marriages
(d) Women reproductive and care-giving roles under stress
(e) Changed labor market participation from death of family members
(f) Higher incidence of domestic violence
(g) Possibility for greater political participation
(h) Women increased economic participation due to changing gender roles
during conflict
3. Common Potential impact of Land conflicts
(a) Depression, trauma, and emotional distress
(b) Asset and income loss
(c) Tendency toward increased migration
(d) Disrupted patterns of marriage and fertility
(e) Loss of family and social networks, including insurance mechanisms
(f) Interrupted education
(g) Eroded well-being, particularly poor health and disability from poverty and
malnutrition
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1.4.2 Income Polarization: an overview of Brazil
The debates on economic inequalities–i.e. the wealth or/and income inequality–in
development has long venerable tradition in political economy. Beginning from the
classical economics which posited inequalities as teleological impediments on path
of welfare of society. For instance, Smith (2005) asserted that the true measure of
a nations´ wealth is not the size of its king’s treasury or the holdings of an affluent
few but rather the wages of the laboring poor. Similarly, Ricardo (1821) put together
on Smiths´ precept arguing that comparative advantage has historical precedence in
the comparative paucities of the nations. But both Smith and Ricardo pursue heed
to wage dispersion as that of income inequality; up until Marx and Works (1936a)
lauded the inequalities as inevitable, intrinsic and incessant logic of capitalist mode of
production. Inequality, for Marx’s work, is totality of both cause and suit of capitalist
form of production organization. This Chapter devourers on Marx’s framework in The
Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen O¨konomie Marx (1993) where class organization
(by means of wage dispersion) operates in (at least) in four ways. Firstly, as the class as
foundational to layout of labor, nay diversifying labor practices, such as race, gender or
income group, and therefore the equally varied ways in which wealth resulting from
laboring practices is appropriated, distributed and received. Secondly, the class as
ontological category gives a potential rendition of coexisting social formations and
labor relations, with capitalism being one (not the only) form15. Thirdly, the class
focused or class specific study inaugurates differing rather heterogeneous language of
labor in particular vis-a`-vis population in general. Lastly, the class organization or
class structure is innate consequence of income organization in society16.
The growth in income concentration as structural class organization in Brazil. The
income inequalities have decreased in relative terms but income has been highly
15The social formation is product as well as condition of capitalist mode of production, yet it is almost
always, thought to be devised as a particular to capitalism
16This has been well presented in The Condition of the Working Class in England by Engels, followed
up in Marx and Works (1936d) focused on worker’s wages and their living conditions, which offered
necessary empirical ground for the subsequent writing of Capital by Marx.
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concentrated at the top of the distribution, with the top 1 per cent amassing a share
of 27 percent in 2013, and consistently fluctuating around 25 to 30 per cent since the
mid 1970’s. This is confirmed by high polarization index in comparison to GINI at
state level, and in higher Theil index at time-series level. The section also presents
a theoretical debate on structural contradiction of income dispersion in below 50%
income, polarization in top 10% to bottom 10% and accumulation in top 1% income
classes in Brazil. The section also debates theoretical implications of inequality and
its class organization. The paper concludes that the national wealth in Brazil is close
concentrated in tope 20% income share of national income, and most of it is owned
by private agents (households). On the other hand, the total value of public assets is
approximately equal to the total public debt (about one year of national income), so
net public wealth is close to zero. Thus, the economic organization of democracy in
Brazil highly relies on its development of income share of bottom 50% groups.
Income inequality and Class organization
Brazil is in transition, since last thirty years. We observe that ‘inequalities declined
rapidly during beginning of 21st century (Mendes, 2014)’ but then again the income
concentration remained static (Cuadrado-Roura and Aroca, 2013). Nonetheless
income concentration as opposed to inequalities has historical precedence in Brazilian
contemporary debates. For example Fontaine and Stehnken (2016) aptly describes,
(. . . ) during the administrations of Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff, the political system
undoubtedly generated a number of achievements that, initially, it would not have been
considered capable of doing. They went from economic stabilization and restructuring the
governments’ financial budget, to decreasing the traditionally high inequality of income and
implementing an effective poverty reduction strategy. All this occurred in the absence of the
general political reform (reforma polıtica) that was so often demanded since the end of the
military regime. In recent years, the political system actually worked in quite the opposite
way, i.e. through small and sometimes tedious reform efforts which frequently went unnoticed.
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Although the political process is still marked by a series of deficits in terms of democracy, the
country is definitely not ungovernable (p. 5).
The inequalities persists even though a significant effort planned by Lula
and Rousseff administrations. Here, Brazil animates a contradictory case of class
organization which is more susceptible to high income concentration than that of
rising middle income groups.
Figure 1.3: Income Share of Top and Bottom 10% and Bottom 50%
Figure 1.4: Income Share of Top 10% and Bottom 50%
Figure 1.3 & 1.4 shows that since 1958-2010, the share of top income docile [D10]
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has been unchanged whereas income share of bottom 10% bottom 50% population has
been increased marginally. In other words, the top 10% population in Brazil earns
more than 42% total income whereas bottom 50% shares less than 10%. Even if, there
is inconsistency17 in Ipeadata (2016) and World Income Inequality Database (2016);
in a essence the income share of top 10% population rests more than 40% in both
datasets. However, significant difference is in Ipeadata (2016) is share of bottom 10%
and 50% population changes to 17 %. This makes considerable change in terms class
organization of new working classes in economy.
Figure 1.5 revels these patterns more clearly, we observe that the top income docile
is still partaking high level of income, in fact we see a pattern of new emerging income
class from 1st to 4th docile income class throughout 1990s to 2000s. However, the top
income docile shares almost static income throughout the yearly points from 1970 to
1990, which is slightly changing during last decade.
Figure 1.5: Income levels by docile in Brazil(IPEA)
The class debate in Brazil puts us to historical diagnostic; in understanding class
and its explication in law of accumulation. Consider, first, the meaning we must now
17In a study based on WIID (2016) datasets, Mila´ (2015) presents that the discrepancy between
taxable income shares and total income shares is a major finding of his study. We observe that the
same discrepancy is inherited here, thus making the share of income groups different in two similar
datasets. To overcome the problem, we take median income, bottom 50% share and GINI on time series
data for 1958-2014 from Ipeadata (2016) to compute GINI, polarization and Theil index in this paper
(see Figure 1.10.
44
attach to ’socially necessary labor time’ as the measure of value. The capitalist class
must reproduce itself, and it can do so only through progressive accumulation. Brazil,
since 1990s towards decade of 2005s have seen precisely this moment of progressive
accumulation. Yet, there is discontinuity in terms of the class relation between
capital and labor requisite to be reproduced. The class as emergent evolutionary
[economic] category features a socially necessary to the reproduction of capitalist mode
of production, there we enter into concept of value.
Here, value thereby loses its simple technological and physical connotation and
comes to be seen as a social relation. Class, especially among the income below D6
but above D4, operates newly formalized ‘Wage labour’ which is both an historical
product and relatively contemporary formation. So is the class relation between
capital and labour. The capitalist law of value is an historical product specific to
societies in which the capitalist mode of production dominates. Brazil exhibits a
crucial case where capitalist mode of production highly organized, urban and localized
and yet dis-aggregated and decentralized. Salas and Santos (2013) aptly puts it as
‘[Brazilian economy is] a highly productive structure under the leadership of the
manufacturing activities along with a process of fast growth both in per capita income
and in urbanization rates [. . . ] This development process, albeit concentrated and
exclusionary, did not prevent the social betterment of important segments of the
population (pp.409-10)’.
Inequality, as seen in Figure 1.5 does not suggest us the change in terms of
inequality over time, in terms of concentration, thus we look at another indicator.
Figure 1.6 shows the evolution of GINI index in Brazil. We observe that spatial
inequality in Brazil based on state-level cross-sectional data. The data shows not only
heterodox stabilization of income vis-a`-vis spatial income inequality in Brazil; in fact;
the in group of figure we extend this analysis to spatial comparison within groups
income inequalities. Table ?? shows ‘Ratio between the average and median values of
the nominal total monthly income’ which are the income ratios in cross-group data,
showing a matches the GINI-Pareto index in Figure 1.6.
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Figure 1.6: GINI Pareto line on income level in 2005
The logical argument here is that both ratios as well as GINI suggests that
deployment of the concept and category ‘class’ is sharply different from extant
non-Marxian and conventional or classical Marxian definitions of class. In case of
Brazil, it, at least, differs in at least two respects. First, the conventional renditions of
class exclude or demote the element of surplus labour from their definition of class,
and instead view class in terms of property or power or income, etc. In contrast,
Resnick and Wolff (1987) insist on the entry point of surplus labour around which class
is understood. They argue that the understanding of class-as-surplus-labour brings its
own uniqueness to social analysis, practice and policy that cannot be reduced to power,
property or income-centric understandings. Second, almost all other theories of class
understand class as a noun, that is, as persons as also a homogenous group of persons
or social actors; however class as noun is logically inconsistent and unsustainable.
Here, If we hark back to top income levels as shown Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8 we
understand that class in Brazil, specially top income class, we observe that the higher
up in the distribution one examines, the lower the volatility in the taxable income
shares (the U-shaped pattern turns more into an L-shaped pattern for the entire period,
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Table 1.1: Comparing mean income levels by groups, gender and region(PNAD,2014)
State of
men
and
women
-
average
of
men
and
women
-
median
by
color
or
race -
black/brown
by
color
or
race -
white/black
by
color
or
race -
white/brown
by color
or race -
white/indigenous
by color
or race -
white/yellow
Acre 1.3 1 0.9 1.7 1.6 2.9 1.4
Alagoas 1.4 1.4 1 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.1
Amapa´ 1.2 1.2 1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2
Amazonas 1.3 1.2 1 1.8 1.8 3.6 1.1
Bahia 1.3 1.2 1 1.7 1.6 2.6 1.5
Ceara´ 1.3 1 1 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.2
Distrito
Federal
1.5 1 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.7 1.5
Espı´rito
Santo
1.5 1.6 1 1.6 1.6 2.9 0.8
Goia´s 1.4 1.6 1 1.6 1.6 2.3 1.1
Maranha˜o 1.5 1.6 0.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3
Mato
Grosso
1.3 1.4 0.9 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.5
Mato
Grosso do
Sul
1.4 1.5 1 1.6 1.6 2 1.2
Minas
Gerais
1.5 1.4 1 1.5 1.5 1.6 0.9
Para´ 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 0.7
Paraı´ba 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.6 0.7
Parana´ 1.3 1.5 0.9 2.1 1.9 1.3 1.5
Pernambuco 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.2
Piauı´ 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.3
Rio de
Janeiro
1 1.4 0.9 1.7 1.5 0.9 1.7
Rio
Grande
do Norte
1.4 1 1 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.4
Rio
Grande
do Sul
1.4 1 1 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.6
Rondoˆnia 1.3 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3
Roraima 1.4 1 0.9 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.4
Santa
Catarina
1.4 1 1 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.5
Sa˜o Paulo 1.4 1 0.9 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.6
Sergipe 1.4 1 0.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.5
Tocantins 1.4 1 1 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.4
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Figure 1.7: Gross taxable Income (2014, Reals), from WIID (2016)
especially for the top 0.01 per cent), and the greater the volatility in the total income
shares. This possibly reflects the fact that a great proportion of the income of the top
0.1 and 0.01 per cent is made up of highly cyclical capital incomes, especially capital
gains, which are more accurately captured in the total income series.
Lastly, we observe that high income concentration in top income class becomes
more evident with spatial allocation of wealth. To elaborate more, we measure
polarization index which is either stable or marginally reduced since 1960s towards
2010s. In theory, this represent a classic social occurrence in Brazil, high income
concentration and rise in income levels of rich leads to political mobilization of
electoral rich at cost of electoral poor. As demonstrated by Dre`ze and Sen (2002) in
case of India, we observe that in Brazil the category ‘worker’ or the ‘working class’–
continuously measured as a disaggregated category can be, to begin with, and for
convenience clubbed into two sub-categories: productive and unproductive. Thus,
income level vis-a`-vis class process affecting class process such as if we take even a
cursory glance at labour data shall show how the mass of unproductive workers shall
be rather large in Brazil, which would be further differentiated depending on their
relationship to various class forms.
However, much of the limitedness of current trade union in urban Brazil has
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Figure 1.8: Income level of rich, 2014, from WIID (2016)
an imagination and praxis focuses on labour in the capitalist class process, hence,
capital-centric, which also emerges from this problematic and simple semantic
inheritance of Marx’s work, where unproductive is read as non-productive. This
has led to specific historical construction of inequality pattern after 2005 to 2015.
Here, considering in the light of Figure 1.10 where polarization index18 changes
not with GINI, and therefore GDP but with change in democratic structures. Here,
the ‘productive–unproductive’ distinction helps differentiate and isolate the mode of
appropriation in the capitalist class enterprise from other modes of appropriation
as also the sphere of circulation. More importantly the difference income level and
class income accumulation in Brazil which leads to debate on Marx (1993) where he
was conceptually separating productive labour from unproductive labour not only to
highlight the specificity of the capitalist class process from other institutional forms,
but also to hint at how even the ‘industrial proletariat’ is disaggregated within class
structures (along with the different kinds of capitalists).
Following Resnick and Wolff (1987), the paper suggests high income polarization
and top income levels leads to at least the two fundamental points of class struggle are
struggle over the existence, quantum, manner and form:
18This is based on Alichi et. al. (2016) formula on page no. 11
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(a) Between group inequality
(b) Within group inequality
(c) Bi-polarization
Figure 1.9: Inequality measures, PNAD data,2004-2014
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Figure 1.10: Inequality measures from Ipeadata (2016) and PNAD (2016)
1. Of the performance and appropriation of surplus labour, which could lead to a
change in forms of enterprises (say, changes within the same type of capitalist
class enterprise) and/or in the types of enterprises (say, a change from capitalist
class enterprise to communist one).
2. Of the distribution and receipt of surplus labour in order to transform the
conditions of existence that underlie performance and appropriation of surplus
labour, and thus effect the process of distribution and receipt of wealth.
Brazil has observed democratic up-heal as result of such class struggle. We observe that
this has been spatially located in urban center while organically linked to periphery of
urban center. The Maps 1.9 suggests uneven development is persistently produced and
reproduced by capital diffusion, and therefore, is an inherent and permanent feature
of capitalism. Unlike the neoliberal contention of the erasure of disparities towards
convergence, Marxists maintain that capital accumulation depends on differential
economic climates for its regeneration. Further, spaces of inequality raises a clout
of the inability to account for multiple forms of laboring practices and providing
language to the complex array of class processes and class related situations have been
an important reason for the recent decline in labor cause. The maps also represent
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the north and north-east Brazil shows the changes in income polarization as opposed
to GINI or Theil; before and after rest of Brazil. Meanwhile the region to enhance
economic activities, and develop the region of south we observe significant value of
polarized as well as diversed income level.
Lastly, the income concentration is observed on basis of geographical-economical
differential environments in north which had have material effects on the ground.
Meanwhile the processes of capital accumulation i.e. income of top docile through
space and time create new geographic landscapes shaped by crisis, de-industrialization
and capital flight from urban to urban space on the one hand, and influxes of capital
and industrialization on the rural space. Brazil is case of patrimonial capitalism Shaikh
(2016) which not only reshuffles core-periphery relations, but rather, as Smith (2005)
claims, it also penetrates all geographic scales. Although, we have argued an account
based on income inequality, we must also suggest that the discipline of economics
has tendency to move away from focusing on the value of freedom to that of utilities,
income and wealth (Sen, 2009, p. 27) however, the logic of seeing utilities, income
and wealth as catalyst towards freedom is but the contradictory realities of Brazilian
experience are no new to democratic society, as Sen (2001)elaborates as following;
The protective power of democracy in providing security is, in fact, much
more extensive than famine prevention. The poor in booming South Korea
or Indonesia may not have given much thought to democracy when the
economic fortunes of all seemed to go up and up together in the 1980s and
early 1990s, but when the economic crises came (and divided they fell) in
the late 1990s, democracy and political and civil rights were desperately
missed by those whose economic means and lives were unusually battered.
Democracy suddenly became a central issue in these countries, with South
Korea taking a major initiative in that direction () Democracy gives an
opportunity to the opposition to press for policy change even when the
problem is chronic and has had a long history, rather than being acute and
sudden, as in the case of famines (p. 549)
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Sen (2001) brings us to contemporary debates on political turmoil, we observe that
the democracy alongside the issues inequality and therefore development has aptly
become a central discourse of Brazilian history. Hence, the debate on inequalities
does not necessarily takes us to question whether subterranean welfare policies,
socialism or development regime is governable or not but to the fundamental
question of evolutionary nature of inequalities in democratic society. We observe that
inequalities are imminent and imbbded in post-colonial society (Piketty et al., 2014)
but democratic practices are, in long term, intrinsic for development; thus making
inequality as major impediment in her path. Sen (2001) aptly puts it,
The value of democracy includes its intrinsic importance in human life,
its instrumental role in generating political incentives, and its constructive
function in the formation of values (and in understanding the force and
feasibility of claims of needs, rights, and duties). These merits are
not regional in character. Nor is the advocacy of discipline or order.
Heterogeneity of values seems to characterize most, perhaps all, major
cultures. The cultural argument does not foreclose, nor indeed deeply
constrain, the choices we can make today.
Inequalities are temporary Heterogeneity in society, mainly democratic society but
left unsolved for long it could become constructive Heterogeneity. Thus this research
concludes on optimistic note that those choices have to be made here and now, taking
note of the functional roles of democracy, on which the case for democracy in the
contemporary world depends. The force of the claim that democracy is a universal
value lies, ultimately, in that strength. That is where the debate belongs. It cannot
be disposed of by imagined cultural taboos or assumed civilizational predispositions
imposed by our various pasts. The efforts of this research are to locate debates on land
economy back to income inequality. In following thesis, we attempt this with empirical
grounding and debates.
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1.5 A short note on methodology
Good econometrics cannot save a shaky research agenda, but the
promiscuous use of fancy econometric techniques sometimes brings down
a good one(Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
Using data from the population as it stands is a dangerous substitute for
testing(Fienberg and Hoaglin, 2007).
We argue that econometric method are identical/complementary processes which are
both Dialectical and Darwinian (Stigum, 2015) together and separately. In this short
section on methodology, we present an elementary perspective on research on conflict
data. We argue that the research on conflict shall be guided by pragmatic insights
from fields, supported by ingenious empirical evidence. The conflict research, unlike
conventional growth or development debate, holds a researcher as well as research
accountable for power structure. The power structure which is responsible and
medium of research objective and methodology. We suggest that insights from field
work, secondary literature guides us to amiable path of mixed method research. The
present research fits into the tradition of positivist–hermeneutic reading of the conflict.
In other words, this research is exercised on mixed methodology approach. By mixed
method, we mean employing extensive secondary resources with sound econometric
methods.
The research has two aims; methodologically, to develop a mixed method
approach to research, transcending traditional quantitativequalitative dyad. The
research proposes to aid statistical tool and analytical generalization, in order to
foster in depth knowledge on real cases as well as theoretical reconstruction of the
idea of–state and–land economy in debates of transcending state borders as in case
of Conflicts in Brazil. Within this methodology potentials and limitations of mixed
methods will be reexamined. Besides addressing these methodological concerns, the
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substantive purpose of the research is to contribute empirically and theoretically to
knowledge of the conflict economics as critique of economic theories of development.
Research, as perceived here, is embedded in power structure. therefore our notion
of empirical grounding of conflict is reflexive and reconstruction. Thus, we shall rely
on theoretical debates in methodology of econometrics vis–a´–vis conflict. The key
chapter on income inequality and land conflict revisits its own method debate. We
shall follow in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
Income inequality and Conflict: a Panel
analysis
Abstract
This Chapter 2 gives a broader analysis into an inequality– a land conflicts in Brazil,
in context of theoretical debates in Chapter 1. We observe conflict trends,in a panel
data for 2004-2014. The Chapter 2 suggests a panel count data model based on
reading Wooldridge (2010), Baltagi (2008) and Wooldridge (2015). We consider
framework of inequality–conflict –land-prices to explore the behavior of predictor
variable–aggregated violence– in panel count data, the data on conflict obtained from
the Comisso Pastoral da Terra (CPT)1, land-prices obtained from Informa Economics
IEG — FNP2 and inequality indicators such as within-group, the between-group,
overall–GINI and polarization indices’s are estimated using Pesquisa Nacional
por Amostra de Domicı´lios (PNAD)3. We began with pooled model for panel in
Poisson distribution, where value of α is significantly lesser than zero.Thus, we move
towards advanced modeling with mixed effects Poisson, we observe a significant
relationship between inequality and land conflicts. In fact, different measures
1https://www.cptnacional.org.br/index.php/biblioteca-virtual
2http://www.informaecon-fnp.com/english/publications
3http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad2013/
microdados.shtm
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of inequality exhibits different relationship with conflict occurrence incidence.
This suggest that within the framework of inequality the horizontal and vertical
inequalities have elusive relationship with incidences of conflicts. The Chapter
analyzes incidences of conflicts with its related probability in terms of violence,
escalations and dislocation–dispossession occurrences. In multi-level mixed effects
models, we observe that state–level variance in conflicts is significance while regional
level is not. This demonstrates that geographical variations in conflict incidence is
significant in model.In summary, we suggest that inequality is driver of conflicts but
it’s more elusive relationship than observed ever before, the horizontal inequality i.e.
between group inequality has positive significance relationship while vertical group
inequality has positive spillover with escalations of conflicts. The count regression
model enables us to argue that there is temporal as well as spatial trends of inequality
vis–a´–vis land conflicts in macroeconomic picture of Brazil.
Keywords: horizontal –vertical inequality, polarization, GINI, land conflicts and
Brazil
2.1 Introduction
The relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed close one, and
it runs both ways.
Sen in On Economic Inequality (Sen, 1973)
How much guidance–it is reasonable to ask–can we expect to get from
modern welfare economics in analyzing problems of inequality? The
answer, alas, is: not a great deal. Much of modern welfare economies is
concerned with precisely that set of questions which avoid judgments on
income distribution altogether. The concentration seems to be on issues
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that involve no conflict between different individuals (or groups, or classes),
and for someone interested in inequality this can hardly make the air
electric with expectations.
Sen on Non-Conflict Economics and Pareto Optimality (Sen, 1973)
This Chapter 2 suggests the land-conflicts, from the general–to–specific theoretical
foundations, where the inequality to conflicts is general framework, and inequality
to land conflicts is a specific one. We suggest that economic inequality via the
polarization index and the GINI index impacts the land conflict and land-prices.Here,
the relationship between inequality and conflict is often traced via polarization and/or
fictionalization (see Alesina et al. (2003) and Esteban and Ray (1994)), in this Chapter
we restate this using the count data panel, for N=27(states in Brazil) and T=11(for
2004-2014). The Chapter covers three main sections, first to overview and theorize the
inequality–violent conflict–land prices, secondly to give a general to specific approach
on estimation of the count panel model, and lastly to be analyzed in details from a
political economic perspective.
Before we begin this Chapter, we shall roll out two important perceptivities
on significance of the objectives that how inequality infuses a conflict or contest.
Firstly, that the relation between inequality and conflict is elusive (Ray and Esteban,
2017), mainly because the economic theory has delved into subject of inequality, and
therefore has improved our understanding of the subject to great deal. However, the
subject of conflict has been rare in core economic theory4, similar to what Sen (1973)
points out that economic theory involve no conflict between different individuals (or
groups, or classes). Now, if it is to be assumed that this lack of conflict-centered
theorization is due to lack of interest then it shall be futile to attempt to revise
4Unlike traditional macro-economics or development economics texts, recent editions are vocal and
receptive about theories on fringes, for instance textbook by Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2017) begins
with premise of open economy, similar is trend in another excellent book by Koop (2017) which
considers economics from Bayesian perspective, unlike traditional frequentist perspective. We would
also like to note some key textbook like contributions, mainly Bardhan (2005),Garfinkel and Skaperdas
(2007),Anderton and Carter (2009) and Chakravarty (2015)
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any theoretical economic axioms. On contrary, we argue that this absence is mainly
due to possibility (not impossibility) of welfare or neoclassical theories to evade a
direct–contest or conflicts–as core matter of inquiry, for instance Sen (1970) concluded
that being of Paretian liberal is assumes a impossible set of maximization axioms,
which are misconstrued as matter of rationality instead of choice(Sen, 1997). The
subject of conflict, nonetheless, remains at core of economic theory, not by its presence
but shear absence in core theories.
Secondly, the set of counting of violent breakouts often corroborate a plausible
hypothesis of latent economic problem, hence to narrow down it to one characteristic
feature of development issues i.e. inequality is somewhat like false injective function.
We shall remain shy from such arguments at all cost. Further, like in mathematics, the
pigeonhole principle states that if n items are put into m containers, with n> m> 0,
then at least one container must contain more than one item. Any society will face
a natural pigeonholing of groups of people in given space (of income or religion),
this, merely, corroborates the fact that individual preferences ripple through the
neighborhood, leading to large-scale patterns (Schelling, 1978).Thus, it is a objective
of this Chapter to argue that inequality as ab initio explication with conflict and not
exclusive one. In fact, we present a broader perspective on conflict studies from varied
subjects. While in this Chapter, we take on case of violent conflict as composite
analysis with income inequality and other variables. We propose a novel framework of
probability distribution analysis via count data model. The Chapter is broadly divided
into two parts, one is that of literature survey and theorization of framework and then
to be studied and analyzed in second part.
2.2 Literature review
The literature on conflict economics, we focus on economic development i.e. inequality
with social conflict i.e. land conflict( for definition of conflict, see 1.1).We organize this
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review examining three common perspectives, that how conflicts are associated with
inequalities; that conflicts are about economic differences (even beyond inequalities)
and that landed conflict is peculiar character of economic society, this is often driven
by economic scarcity, but also by asymmetric power and driven by ethnic motives.
This section is divided into two inter-connected parts, first is overview of debates
on inequalities and conflicts and second, a more specific overview on land conflicts,
inequalities and Brazilian case.
2.2.1 Income polarization, class and conflict
There is no necessary conflict between short-run and long-run
adjustments, both of which are always in force, but operating at different
speeds.
Shaikh on long-run vs. short-run cycle (Shaikh, 1991) and (Shaikh, 2016)
Why are we interested in polarization? It is our contention that the
phenomenon of polarization is closely linked to the generation of tensions,
to the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt, and to the existence
of social unrest.
Esteban and Ray on Polarization and conflicts (Esteban and Ray, 1994)
THE debates on inequalities in economic theory has long venerable tradition in
political economy however classical economist posited inequalities as teleological
impediments on path of welfare of society. Here, Smith (2005) asserted that the true
measure of a nation’s wealth is not the size of its king’s treasury or the holdings of
an affluent few but rather the wages of laboring poor.Ricardo (1821) put together
on Smiths´ precept arguing that comparative advantage has historical precedence in
comparative paucities of the nations. But both Smith and Ricardo pursue heed to wage
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dispersion side of income inequality up until Marx (1992) theorized inequalities as
inevitable, intrinsic and incessant logic of capitalist mode of production. Inequality
in Marxs´ work is totality of both cause and suit of capitalist form of production
organization. This chapter devourers on Marxs´ framework in The Grundrisse der Kritik
der Politischen O¨konomie (Marx, 1993) where class organization operates in [at least]
four ways; first class as foundational to layout of labor, nay diversifying labor practices,
such as race, gender or income group, the equally varied ways in which wealth
resulting from laboring practices is appropriated, distributed and received. Second,
class as ontological category gives a potential rendition of coexisting social formations
and labor relations, with capitalism being one (not the only) form. Third, the class
focused or class specific study inaugurates differing rather heterogeneous language of
labor in particular vis-a`-vis population in general. Lastly, the class organization or
class structure is innate consequence of income organization in society5.
But before,we enter in debates on class we shall begin theorizing income
polarization.To be sure of covering enormous literature6 on economic inequality,
we prefer to choose eclectic, yet prudent approach: we concur that economic
inequality may be sought, at least, in dual ways, firstly as income inequality and
secondly as wealth inequality.The key insight from works of Alesina and Rodrik
(1991),Stewart et al. (2002),Esteban and Ray (2007) and Acemoglu and Wolitzky
(2014) is that inequality–within and between groups–infuses conflict escalation, in
terms of–horizontal and vertical–inequalities7. Esteban and Ray (2008) reformulates
that it is through uneven growth (and inequality) the reactions emerges, they are as
collective aspiration which are socially constructed. Reactions in terms of violent
5This has been well presented in The Condition of the Working Class in England by Marx and
Works (1936c) focused on worker’s wages and their living conditions, which offered necessary empirical
ground for the subsequent writing of Capital by Marx.
6In our opinion, Sen (1973) is till date the best take on the subject of economic inequality. Recently,
Piketty et al. (2014) and Chakravarty (2015) gave two compelling accounts of inequalities, one on
evolutionary nature of economic inequality and other on definitive role of economic inequality in
society.Shaikh (2016) has given a incisive account of inequality dealing with triad of competition,
cooperation and conflicts.
7The literature on inequality and conflict, till date, has evolved as pivotal in many research traditions
across world. An excellent review and study of such an approach is Cederman et al. (2013) and
Chakravarty (2015).
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conflicts, aspirations as coercion and contest between groups, Ray and Vohra (2001)
argued it in context of coalitional public good formation where violent conflict is more
often a concrete result, or at least as spill-over effects (Mitra and Ray, 2014).
Esteban et al. (2012) gives an elaborate account of these premises, where the
ethnicity by means of ethnicization results into contested goods and conflicts. Note
that, in theory, at least, these notions of inequality lead conflict is as old as Smith
(2005) claiming that inequality by majority is disadvantage onto itself while Marx
and Works (1936a) constructed a holistic class theory of conflicts. However, recent
advances in the subject of political economic perspective, combines the classical notion
of conflict in the society with the contemporary notion of contest, competition and
cooperation8. Shaikh (2016) gave in-depth treatise on the subject from neo-Marxian
and neo-Ricardian (or rather from a Sraffian concept of production of commodities
by commodities). He argues that historically the Schumpeterian vision in argument:
from the classical, to Marxian towards Keynesian or more aptly Kaleckian theorization
of ruthless two classes refines the capitalist class via competition, cooperation and
conflict. Here, the maximizing consumer of Fisher’s approach9 dominates the theory
while capitalist reigns the consumption alongside production dynamics. We believe
the book has at par significance as that of Piketty et al. (2014). In fact, we perceive that
following the –vertical and horizontal–inequalities framework, Shaikh (2016) retakes
the notion of inequality in Marxian and Kaleckian sense where the distinction between
property income and labor income, which might be re calibrate as wealth and income
(inequalities) holds a prime significance in contemporary economics.
Banerjee et al. (2001), Piketty and Saez (2006), Piketty et al. (2014) and
Chakravarty (2015) put the analysis of income distribution back to center stage10.
However, Shaikh (2017) envisioned it as a concrete distinction between property
8Earliest account of such debate in economics arose from public economics and institutional
economic schools, mainly key contributions by Ostrom (2015), North (1990) and Olson (1989), and
Veblen (1964)
9See Fisher’s model of intertemporal consumption
10The putting back to center of income distribution owes much more debt to number of economist,
including Saez,Barns, Atiknson, Madison and so on. Please refer a collective work here by Atkinson and
Piketty (2010)
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income and labor income plays a central role in this framework. Property income
derives from the rate of return on stocks of income-earning wealth, in contemporary
division of society, the return are unevenly distributed towards one small fraction of
people. Piketty et al. (2014) argues that because the rate of return (r) is generally
greater than the rate of growth of the economy (g), property income tends to grow more
rapidly than labor income, so that rising income inequality is an intrinsic tendency
of capitalism despite interruptions due to world wars and great depressions. Shaikh
(2017) disabuses, he suggests the rise of unions and the welfare state were the fruits
of long-term historical gains made by labor, and the postwar constraints on real and
financial capital arose in sensible reaction to the Great Depression. The neoliberal
era beginning in the 1980s significantly rolled back all of these. The paper builds on
principles of econophysics, mainly Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2000) and Dra˘gulescu
and Yakovenko (2001a) that the empirical degree of inequality using two factors alone:
the profit share and the degree of financialization of income. In other words, the rise
of inequality in neoliberal era is due to reduction of the wage share (while rising profit
share) , Shaikh (2017) aptly conduces that, there is no inevitable return to Pikettys
patrimonial capitalism.
Note that, the distinction and definition of property income and labor income
is crucial for this Chapter, mainly because of three reasons. Firstly, the distinction
between the property income and the labor income might give, to some reader, a
false appearance that they are two separate entities in economic theory. We argue
that property income and labor income, in macro-dynamic of economic society holds
a synthesized weight, which Marx and Works (1936d) puts down as class dynamics
in society. Logically, we perceive that to measure property income is difficult for the
objective of this paper, we have relied on labor income as central notion. Secondly,
both Piketty et al. (2014) and Shaikh (2016) insist on the dynamics between these two,
primly via wealth and income inequalities perspective. Therefore, we perceive the
incalculable unity of these dynamic of inequality in capitalist system as to be ciphered
into modes and methods of fractionalization and polarization of labor income. Lastly,
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Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko (2001b), Banerjee and Piketty (2005),Piketty and Saez
(2006) and Ray (2010), all have, once, argued that labor income causes immediate
up-heal in macro-dynamics of economy while wealth income does so in long term.
Albeit, taking a Que from Shaikh (1991) we shall suggest that there no necessary
conflict between short-run and long-run adjustments, both of which are always in
force, but operating at different speeds. In summary, we suggest a composite measure
of accounting inequality by two main theories one the GINI index and polarization
index to be modeled in the analysis section11. Now that we reckon a neoliberal
adjustment have some intrinsic, built-in drive towards the creation of economic
inequality, then we arrive at question that what features of the distribution of income
or wealth are likely to be closely correlated with the possibility of social unrest and
conflict?(Esteban and Ray, 1994). This is the question at heart of this chapter, we argue
that the genealogy of inequality into conflict has a natural application in economic
theory. Where a population of individuals, each evolving in non-convex nature
of accumulation of capital. The inequalities may persist and magnify as complex
system of market society. Nonetheless, proving contradictory to natural application
of evolution in economic theory, therefore as emergence of conflict.
TRANSCEND: From polarization-fractionalization to compromise & negotiations
Here, we observe that in order to probe into the relationship between income
distribution, social conflicts and economic growth. The economic theory is
moving away from linear, equilibrium and utility based approach to non-linear,
non-equilibrium and behavioral approach. In his classic undertaking titled
TRANSCEND, the social scientist Johan Galtung , in Galtung (2000) argued the
approach that the focus is on peace, a relation between the parties, not on security.
Instead of complementary, compatible goals lead to ever higher levels of peace.Galtung
(2000) conceives conflict as the untransformed relationshipbetween the parties (in
11Cowell (2011) elaborates an in-depth mathematical foundation on how one can utilize a gini index
or Pareto distribution in exploring income distribution in economy. In Chapter 4 of his book, he
proposes a modeling principle of inequality. For better review article, please refer Yitzhaki (1998).
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conflict). Therefore, peace is process depending on transformation of relationships, for
which, transcendence. Unlike conventional winner or loser paradigm, this approach
proposes to construct whole ‘new’ sets of reality, for instance with the establishment of
the European Union the interstate violence in Europe is almost negligible. In summery,
Galtung (2000) suggests the compromises and negotiations as a twofold method to
achieve the transcendence. In his critical analysis of what happens before violence?
Galtung (2000) asserts two important symptoms one is polarization and another is
fractionalization. Now, in economic theory, this approach might sound out-warding
but we believe that pinning down a problem to a concrete reality of polarization not
only help us to analyze the conflicts but to resolve them too.
The emergence of conflict sought via polarization is based on two key papers, Esteban
and Ray (1994) and Cederman et al. (2013). Also, Chakravarty (2015) suggests
an in-depth analysis of polarization and conflicts. He demonstrated that from a
traditional measure of (ethnic) fractionalization is given by probability that two
randomly drawn individuals from the population belong to two different groups. Its
theoretically maximum is reached (=1) when each person in population belongs to
different groups. On the other hand, the simple measure of polarization reaches their
maximum when two equally sized groups face each other. But the empirical results
are vague, if not contentious. By and large, it is fair to say that most of the literature
fails to find any significant evidence of ethnic fractionalization as a determinant of
conflict Esteban and Ray (2008). In this Chapter, we review a detailed literature on
Brazil(please refer, 2.1 and 2.2), alongside a macro-economic research by Easterly et al.
(1997),Alesina et al. (2003),Duclos et al. (2004),Esteban and Ray (2007), and recently
byRay and Esteban (2017), we conclude that in Brazil, the income inequality matters
more than ethnic fractionalization. But for matter of conceptual debate and clarity
of mathematical notions we refer to fractionalization measure alongside polarization
measure.12.
12Please refer section on Data and Methodology on formulas and calculations.
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Chakravarty and Maharaj (2011) notes down that whether the societal conflict
is the result of fractionalization or polarization is an unresolved question, open
for in-depth research. Recently, Ray and Esteban (2017), Mayoral and Ray (2015)
and Chakravarty (2015) argued that the relations between income polarization
to conflict is seemingly significant estimation, at least, in terms macro-economic
understanding where focus is on world-over sampling. Similar to Chakravarty and
Majumder (2001) who concluded that there is, indeed, a mathematical formulation
to give a composite estimation of income polarization, uneven growth and social
conflicts. Similar arguments are presented by Esteban and Ray (2008) with additional
perspective that, fractionalization as measure of division in society does not justify
the income convergence, which in turn is aptly described by Esteban et al. (2012)
in measure of polarization. Chakravarty and Maharaj (2012) takes a curious step
applying ethnic prefix to polarization index. Thus estimating that polarization, in
theory, is statistically significant measure of probability (distribution density) in any
given income levels. Note that, fundamentally, we conceive that income dispersion,
by default, is fuel to conflict or contest in similar groups, however, the lines of
contest might differ from ethnic to regional or linguistic prefix. The basic narrative
remains same. In our opinion, the inequality induced conflict is plausible estimation
however to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between
the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and
fractionalization in each of these cases or events of conflicts. The possible solution
for this is to study and model a count event data as pooled series in given region.
Mitra and Ray (2014) demonstrate this in case of Hindu-Muslim conflict in India.
What is Income Polarization?
Polarization is about measuring polarity in given sample of income.The concept
of polarization is relatively new but its theoretical roots can be traced back to, at
least classical economics of Smith and Say, obviously in works of Marx and Engels.
However, the concrete notion of polarization as bio-polarization emerged in modern
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physics, where the unpolarized light waves were transformed into polarized in
order to study them under vector assumptions.Polarization in economics occurs
in early works of Akerlof (1997) and Easterly et al. (1997). One of the key paper
is by Alesina et al. (2003). Note that, before Esteban and Ray (1994) wrote a
foundation work, the notion of polarization was in debate as tool to determine the
class dynamics between the middle class and rich class. After that, we observe a
shift towards a multi-class perspective within economics and sociology. This seems
to have affected our understanding of class dynamics , where scholars began putting
income inequality at heart of public goods distribution, social dispersion, deviations
and politics.Naturally, the notion of polarization began expanding from its earlier
bi-polarization to multi-polarization view, which resulted into key input by scholars
on conflicts studies and political economy.Chakravarty and Majumder (2001) wrote
an excellent account of welfare alongside inequality and polarization, followed by
key research by Esteban and Ray (2007),Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Duclos et al.
(2004) and Ray and Vohra (2001). These scholars gave a macro-economic account of
how and why unequal societies results into asymmetric institutions and then social
conflict or contest. Ray (2010) gave a holistic account of development economics
where income polarization and fractionalization are key theoretical under-pinning
for macroeconomic foundations of development. Polarization, as concept now,
has two theoretical views, first on study of shrinking middle class and second on
clustering of population in groups. Mathematically, all these equations have a
conceptual relation with each other but their interpretations changes. Chakravarty
(2015) presents an evolutionary account of measurement of inequality from GINI to
social multi-polarization. The book summarizes that indicators of inequality are often
employed to judge the distributional effects of a particular economic policy or evaluate
a particular distribution. This gives us a unique opportunity of research to explore
micro-foundations of distributions and distributional effects on other parameters in
given society. In same line of thought, we-present a novel approach in this chapter to
see distributional effects of income on land conflicts.
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We notice that there is mathematical problem with the fractionalization measurement
is that it does not take into account the share of all ethnic groups in a country. If,
for example, a country with three different ethnic groups has a population share
of 50 per cent for the largest group and 25 percent each for the other two groups
would have the same fractionalization measure as a country with three ethnic groups
whose share was 50 percent, 49 percent, and 1 per cent. The share of the population
had by all ethnic groups is important in the measure. Polarization takes this into
account where fractionalization does not. In case of Brazil, Alston et al. (1999a),Alston
et al. (1999b), Bar-El (2008) and Anderson et al. (2015) have appropriately argued
that fractionalization is historically and sociologically a difficult paradigm, instead
polarization is apt for highly unequal society in Brazil. In this Chapter, we follow, an
overview of polarization measure by Van Kerm (2009b), Esteban and Ray (1994) and
Silber (1989) to compute a log-term data from PNAD for index of income polarization
in 2004 to 2014.? presents a flexible tool in Stata to measure variety of polarization
index, with conventional GINI. Here, we measure six dimensions of inequality to
be correlated with land conflicts in analysis section. But before we delve into those
issues, we shall conclude that inequality–conflict, indeed is an elusive relationship,
in fact, Marx and Works (1936b) founds inequality of income as well as wealth as
fundamental contradiction of capital, Dragulescu and Yakovenko (2000) reiterates
that relationship using classical physics to explain a complex nature of money, and
thereby income-wealth genesis in society. For us, it is important that inequality has
to be undershorts in holistic sense that it is income or wealth, the strive for equality
has intrinsic nature of volatility in given society. We observe that it stems a grate
revolutionizer as well as minuscule repercussions in society. In summary,we propose
the following framework as given in Box 2.2.1;
Property income and labor income ⇔ wealth and income inequalities⇔
Fractionalization and Polarization of income groups ⇔ Conflicts, Contest and
Competition.
To summarize, hark back to Becker and Tomes (1979) where inequality is
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convergence and luck. Here, luck is obvious notion while convergence, in our opinion,
plays a crucial role in unfolding of conflicts in given society. Cramer (2003) insists
that convergence of income formulate a complex nexus of inequality resulting into a
social conflict between the class, while Fearon (2008) suggests that as counter-intuitive
it may sound but when poorer economic agents experience faster growth than richer
counterparts, the Solow type model, explores a capital and labor, and constant fraction
of capital in terms of income is saved, and the micro-economic agents acts as to
savior of capital stock that has larger marginal impact on their own income, at
this stage controlling for savings rate becomes crucial.Now, if the poor have lower
savings rates than the rich, then the convergence process could be attenuated or even
reversed. The same could happen if ”agents” are replaced by ”countries”, and poorer
countries have higher population growth rates than their richer counterparts. Thus
the convergence idea, properly interpreted, does not really mean that all economic
do actually converge. But it does mean that a failure to observe convergence must
be traced to one or another of the additional factors that we’ve just described, such
as varying savings rates or demographics.Now, this kind of approach may explain
an economy tied up in a peculiar view of inequality, which we overcome, at least
incoherent with social factors and at most a historic at all. Another view on inequality,
rejects a formulation based on convergence, instead base its research in fact that
population is segregated on basis of their income, which generates aspirations and
coercion within and between groups. We believe that both view has a distinct
takeaways for our work, mainly on fundamental issue of group dynamics and social
conflicts. We explore them in next sections.
Group comparison as source of conflict
Group comparison is key objective of this Chapter, as we presume that polarized
groups tend to have more contests or conflicts. In fact, polarized groups often
perceive competition in market space as spill-over of contest in property sphere.
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Now such a theorization commonplace in legal anthropological or political science
perspectives13, where the group comparison is tool of deciphering a market society. In
economic terms, we look back to classic work by Akerlof (1997) on social distance
and social choices, he argues that the social distance are often formulations of
social considerations such as inequality or homicides, which impacts social choices.
These choices are collective behavior of groups directed towards another groups.Gurr
(1980) gave a insightful empirical evidence for such economic systems, where group
comparison, in economic, social or political parameters impacted societal conflicts.
Gurr (2000) wrote a classic text on minorities at risk for world-wide sample data.
Minorities at risk consolidated a debate not only on ethnic–identity based conflicts
but also on social conflicts in general. The text mentions that property–resource as a
key motivator for social conflicts in developing countries. Cramer (2003) reiterated
this conclusion while adding that developing countries faces more violent conflicts
based lack of institutional coping mechanism, Cederman et al. (2013) gave incisive
argument how group comparison led to grievances which further delve into violent
conflicts. The book takes a macro-economic approach while bringing the concept
such as institutions, political parties and ideology etc into center of debate. In
long line of research, Ray and Esteban (2017) reformulates the complex debate on
conflicts and development, only to be reiterated from broader empirical insights
from Shaikh (2016), Piketty et al. (2014) and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014). We
perceive group comparison for dual nature, firstly we reckon that income groups
for higher strata are same groups holding property in Brazil. Secondly, the income
difference or comparison is day–to–day activity between the class of income, Ray
(2006) demonstrates that high income inequality led to aspiration and perspiration
of conflicts and contest in between the groups. Acemoglu et al. (2012) has given a
historical account of similar trends. Another classic work is by Fay and James (2008)
on anthropology of land institutions, the book gave a consolidated account of political
economic institutional dynamics of land –as property—as mode of production and
13See Boone (2007),Boone (2013) for a case in study for African land tenure and for amazing account
of legal anthropological perspective on property see von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006).
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means of productions. The institutions, as perceived by property holders are nothing
but aspirations in actions, and conflicts are perspiration over those institutions.
Group entitlement as source of conflict
Group comparison is key in funding a conflicting society but this does not mean
that every difference will lead to conflicts or contest. In fact, to find out the
difference which led to conflicts is central focus of any social research on conflicts.
We perceive that it is the group entitlement alongside the group entitlement led to
conflicting paradigm. Gurr (2015) wrote another classic text on why men rebel, the
confounding variables in conflict society are the same causing conflict at first, in
fact, Chakravarty (2015) theorizes inequality index as difference between and within
groups of income. By this definitions, we have seen group comparison as horizontal
inequality in society or between group inequality component of society. However,
we need to focus on vertical component that infuses an entitlement politics withing
groups of incomes.For instance, Caldeira (2008) wrote that it is–my land versus your
land—struggle within groups in Brazil causes day–to–day conflicts or disputes while
violent outbreaks are causes by inter-group dynamics.Similar conclusion are observed
in works of Clements and Fernandes (2013),Barros et al. (2012)Wolford (2010) and
Wolford (2003a). Banerjee et al. (2001) wrote an excellent paper on sugar cooperatives
in India, the paper puts a framework of group entitlement, first as economic terms via
income inequality and second as political representation in democratic politics.The
paper concludes that group entitlement led to intra-group disputes and conflicts. In
case of Brazil, we have to observe that land conflicts are often a confrontation between
landless as much as it is between landlords and landless.
2.2.2 Land conflicts, Inequality and Brazilian case
In these sections, we review literature on land conflicts, inequality in general and on
Brazil in particular. The literature on land conflicts is as pervasive as that of inequality.
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We choose to focus a specific case of Brazil, while eclectically refereeing some key
works in the field.The land conflicts are defined land related disputes,conflicts and/or
contest as defined by CPT(see 1.1). The literature on land conflicts may be organized
into five main sections, which are overlapping and intersecting other key research
fields. Note that, much of literature in this dissertation is on economics and political
sciences, therefore we choose not to cite them differently. The land conflicts literature
is organized as from key research focus, such as if focus on environmental security or
political ecology. There are following five groups of literature besides conflict studies,
economics and political sciences;
• Environmental security: competition over scarce resource perspectives on study
of resource conflicts
• Political ecology: the political production of scarcity and exclusion
• Legal anthropological perspectives: contested land governance
• Political economy of conflicts: division of society led to fractionalization and
polarization
• Socio-historical view on land conflicts
In legal anthropology perspectives, von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) wrote a detailed
treatise on how and why changing notions of property gives rise to contesting forms
of governance, where regulations rely on a combination of spatial and temporal
management that end up limiting peoples´ access to resource or monopolizing and
homogenization of production process via extractivism. Thus land governance
has become a key for contemporary land economy. On similar lines, Binswanger
et al. (1995) theorized a land relations and asymmetric power structure has to be
regulated via organic governance. Reydon (2011b) argues that a historical background
of landholding and land property regulation in Brazil is a key spectacle of land
appropriation where land management regimes increasingly rely on the agrarian and
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non-agrarian appropriation. De Janvry et al. (2001) brings a key point to debate
that access to land rights has inherent question of access to market and political
power. In consolidating political economic perspective, Bardhan (2005) argues a
necessity of land governance is embedded in inclusive governance, which in turn forms
fundamentals of inclusive market. The dynamic of scarcity economics holds reign
of market in developing societies, however the asymmetric market and distribution
reigns origins in asymmetric power structures. Li (2007) argues that governmentality
of power inherits a social structure of economy. Boone (2014),Li (2014) and Hall
(2015) consolidates a debate on framework that land governance is essentially a
development mechanism where property politics is dynamic self-adopting system of
power hierarchies, often imitating the respective social-economic hierarchies. In case
of land governance, the tenure or property regime has a as key role to play as that of
central bank lending rates.
In article on theorizing land–conflict nexus, Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar
(2016) chalks out a framework of framing and alliance as key sociological norms in
given society, for instance a close look at Brazilian land tenure structure revels that the
alliance between classes is rare phenomenon in resolving land disputes, however the
framing is widespread. Wolford (2005) theorizes such phenomenon in local politics
under framework of moral economies of land. Note that, in this Chapter, we attempt
to measure a alliance and framing as part of polarized class structure, following Ray
and Esteban (2017) we can argue that alliance is economic truce while framing is
contest and conflicts. A key take-away from Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar (2016)
is that the land–conflict is not linear relationship of interest but a complex nexus. We
observe similar argument, where Pons-Vignon and Lecomte (2004) revels how land
violent conflict and development are intertwined in this complex nexus, the paper
is key for out work in a sense that landed conflicts are essentially hindrance and
solving them is a step in stone towards development. In debates on land violent
conflict–development, Besley and Ghatak (2009) associates the notion property rights
and economic development, thus invoking age-old concern on if development then
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sustainable property rights. But how one shall process towards an inclusive property
rights framework in market society where incentives on inclusive development are
rare to be stumbled upon, here Besley et al. (2012) suggests that incentives and de
soto effects, where the consequences of improving property rights to facilitate the
use of fixed assets as collateral14, then here can be significant increases in profits
and reductions in interest rates when credit markets are competitive; these are due
to reductions in moral hazard, that is, increased effort, the welfare gains tend to be
modest when cost of effort is taken into account. The paper narrows down how
the improved property rights assures improved wealth distribution, and decreasing
inequalities. However, the need of property rights in development does not infer a
need of social rights, Bester and Wa¨rneryd (2006) arrives at conclusion that social
conflict and social contract are not mutually exclusive paradigms, in fact the social
conflicts are essentially a social contract of asymmetric, unequal and biased power
structure, where conflicts are spill-over of these structures. This research argues that
it is holistic frame of conflicts–development–social contract which shall resolve the
land governance practices in developing societies.
Now that we have argued how land conflicts invokes a broader debate on
development, we shall mention some key works in context of Brazil which employs
similar framework as that of this Chapter, Gasparini et al. (2008) wrote an empirical
evidence on how income polarization and conflicts in Latin America, the paper
employs a polarization of economic indicators such as wealth and income to be
correlated with corruption, conflicts and protestation within Latin America. It
concludes that polarization is key estimator of conflicts in Latin American context
with higher corruption index and lurking political instability the economies of Latin
America are more prone to conflicts or criminal behavior. In Latin American context,
the institutions and conflicts interact in peculiar ways, with various characteristic of
income distribution. There is some evidence that in the LAC context institutional
development has been associated with lower absolute poverty, but not significantly
14popularly attributed to the influential policy advocate Hernando de Soto
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with lower polarization and inequality. Instead, conflicts seem to be more related
to polarization and inequality than to poverty.Polarization and inequality measures
are highly correlated in the data. At least in the Latin American context and for
the indicators used in this paper, income inequality seems a good proxy for income
polarization.Azzoni (2001) Pereira et al. (2016) and Clementi and Schettino (2013)
reaches to similar lines of conclusion. We observe that polarization and poverty
has theoretical underpinning in institutional framework, in terms of polarization as
holistic picture income distribution of society. In this Chapter, we proceed with cation
that poverty is presumed paradigm in high polarized society, almost like co-linear
behavior in econometric models. In this Chapter, we will attempt to demonstrate that
conflicts–poverty is highly contagious phenomenon but has a polarization being more
apt of paradigm.
In next sections, we begin with fundamentals of count data modeling and results.
In Table 2.1 and 2.2 we give a key content analysis of articles and books referred in
this dissertation.
Land prices, Land types and conflict
Land conflicts have elusive relationship with income inequality, however the land
prices are less explored paradigm within land conflicts and income inequalities.
Chakravorty et al. (2013) and Banerjee et al. (2001) links economic inequality to
collation politics in local land economic system. The paper outlines a theory of rent
seeking within farmer cooperatives in which inequality of asset ownership affects
relative control rights of different groups of members. The paper concludes that
wealthier members operates dominant into market to control prices. In our context,
the Brazilian economy is complex structure, the rent seeking, land control and
conflicts is as complex paradigm as any market operations. In this Chapter we keep
land-prices as key variable in modeling but we specifically focus on land prices and
conflict. Note that, the Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 the land prices a pivotal to our debate
on conflicts, but in count data model we have limitations on exploring the land prices
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Table 2.1: Literature Review
Reference Title Content analysis
Dean (1971) History of latifundia in Brazil and land policy
Hall (1990) History land tenure in Brazil
Branda˜o et al. (1990) Farmland prices in Brazil and regularization debate
Place and Hazell (1993) Debates on marginal productivity, tenure efficiency and
indigenous land systems
Binswanger et al. (1995) Theorizing land ownership, production and landed
relations
Petras (1998) Political and social variations of land occupation
Deininger et al. (1999) Evolution of land policy of world bank
Alston et al. (1999a) Empirical model of land conflicts and contests
Da Costa (2000) Overview of Brazilian history from social history
perspectives of workers and peasants
Alston et al. (2000) Exploration of land reform and conflicts in Brazil
Deininger and Feder (2001) Exploring land institutional, market and governance
De Janvry et al. (2001) Access to land rights and tenure in development
prospective
Wolford (2003a) Families and land politics in social mobilization
Wolford (2003b) Theorizing MST as producing community perspective
Petras and Veltmeyer (2003) Critique of Cardoso’s land policy and its impact
Borras (2003) Critiquing market led land reform in Brazil
Deininger et al. (2003) theorization of land policy as poverty reduction
mechanism
Simmons (2004) Political economy of land conflict
Pons-Vignon and Lecomte (2004) Framing land–violent conflict–development paradigm
Wolford (2004) A Study of sugarcane cropping from
anthropologist-legal debates
Wolford (2005) Impact of neo-liberalism on Brazilian land economy and
systems
Simmons (2005) Territoriality in land conflict, its politics in local
economy in Brazilian Amazon
Fernandes (2005) Land occupation as a form of access to land in Brazil
from political economic lenses
Reydon (2006) Institutional perspective of social embeddedness and
land economy
Deininger and Castagnini (2006) incidence and impact of land conflicts
Puppim de Oliveira (2008) Insecure property rights are among the main causes of
land conflicts and deforestation
De Oliveira (2008) Property rights disputes in Brazilian Amazon
Wehrmann (2008) Institutional economic perspective as guide for further
research
Behrendt and Kelly (2008) Indigenous land rights, tenure and territory
perspectives
Deininger and Feder (2009) A positive impact of land registration and tenure system
on development and dispute mitigation
De Luca and Sekeris (2009) Land inequality across landlords only influences the
intensity of fight against a rebel group constituted by
landless individuals
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Table 2.2: Literature Review(continued)
Reference Title Content analysis
Alston et al. (2009) Theorizing de facto and de jure property debates
Alston et al. (2010) Intra and Inter grouping of Brazilian land conflicts
Hidalgo et al. (2010) Theorizing economic determinants of land contest and
conflicts
Mueller and Mueller (2010) History of Brazilian land reforms
Wolford (2010) Social mobilization of land politics and policies in Brazil
after 1980
Reydon (2011b) Agrarian review of Brazilian land governance
Reydon (2011a) Trends and causes of deforestation and agrarian take on
it
Holden et al. (2011) Impact of low cost land registration and certification on
the land conflicts
Deininger and Byerlee (2011) Impact of growing farmland appropriation and
extractivism
Deininger and Byerlee (2012) Rise and consolidation of big farmland and their
impacts
Barros et al. (2012) A study of landless peasants’ movement from land
tenure regime
Jensen and Srensen (2012) Exploring relationship between land inequality and
conflicts
Sauer and Pereira Leite (2012) Agrarian land prices, foreign land grabs and
development
Sullivan (2013) Identity politics in land tenure, conflict and use regime
in Brazil
Sole´-Olle´ and Viladecans-Marsal (2013) Effects of party politics and ideology on land polices
Oliveira (2013) Land regularization, grab and accumulation in Brazilian
history
Hall (2013) Accumulation, land grab and extractivism
Barros et al. (2014) Land tenure conflict and estimation by spatial methods
Reydon et al. (2014) Study of land prices from institutional and
post-Keynesian perspectives
Eck (2014) Institutional structure of the legal system to
understanding communal land conflict
Gollnow and Lakes (2014) The case of soy production and cattle ranching in Brazil
2001–2012 from policy debate
Reydon et al. (2015) Land tenure–conflicts and novel approach on land
governance debate
Muoz Mora et al. (2015) Armed conflicts and related land politics
Cisneros et al. (2015) Theorizing naming and shaming phenomenon in
Brazilian Amazon
Wolford (2015) Land question as Pangaea in local economy of Brazil
Anderson et al. (2015) Land registration and impact on deforestation in Brazil
Krieger and Meierrieks (2016) Increasing risk of land conflicts in response to ethnic
polarization
Van Leeuwen and Van Der Haar (2016) Importance of alliances between local disputes and
broader cleavages, and of processes of framing in
theorizing land politics and conflicts.
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in respective states mainly due to two reasons, firstly we do not consider different
land types in states, where different states has different land types and their respective
prices. Secondly, we have prices varying across types of land this makes it difficult to
capture the conflicting land type in model. Thus, we manage crate a limited analysis
of both a land-type specific econometric model and general model, including land
conflicts, inequality and land prices.
2.3 Data and Methodology
Bu Fu to Chi Po: “No, no! You have merely painted what is!
Anyone can paint what is; the real secret is to paint what isn’t.”
Chi Po: “But what is there that isn’t?”
–Oscar Mandel, Chi Po and the Sorcerer: A Chinese Tale for Philosophers and
Children
Count data modeling is important tool for empirical analysis, ranging from crime
counts (Britt et al., 2017), patent analysis (Aktekin et al., 2017), evolutionary biology
(Zhang et al., 2017b), and so on. The approach of these papers has been as varied
as objectives for instance McDermott et al. (2017) employs hierarchical modeling
of count data from Bayesian statistics, while Baetschmann and Winkelmann (2017)
employs dynamic hurdle model to estimate a matching score in regression15. In
general, the focus as well as significance of discrete data analysis and therefore count
data models has been growing fast. Along with negative binomial, Poisson panel
regression are a preferred method of analysis because the Poisson conditional fixed
effects maximum likelihood estimator (PCFE) and its sandwich variance estimator are
15For collective reference, see Cameron and Trivedi (2013) elaborates dynamic count models in
Chapter 11, and in Chapter 12 extensive survey of Bayesian methods.
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consistent even if the data are not Poisson-distributed (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).
The Poisson and negative binomial models are estimated under mixed effects model
are able to to consider the over time effects and conditional fixed effects which makes
them a preferred method of analysis, however also be affected by correlation in the
cross-section.
This Chapter, as shown in Flowchart 2.3.1, begins with no prior model in study
of land conflicts in particular or conflict–inequality in general. Therefore, we move
forward with conventional general to specific modeling with variables as well as method
of estimations. We begin with Poisson and negative binomial models under fixed
effects, random effects, between effects and population averaged model16. These
models help us to narrow down the behavior of count predictor variable, which
further helps us to move towards Poisson and negative binomial models and marginal
coefficient estimation. In last step, we observe that panel model of Poisson data raises a
critical question of maximum likelihood estimation approach, albeit, it is a venerated
approach in estimation but to describe our data, based on post-estimation results, we
conclude to move towards the mixed effects and pseudo-maximum likelihood method
of estimation. In the end, we recheck sandwich variance estimation using a novel
spatial error estimates developed by Bertanha and Moser (2016).The logic of this
step is just to confirm our results from earlier mixed effects modeling, in fact, the
method of estimation is similar in both steps, only added benefit is that we get a
spatial errors estimation and sandwich estimations alongside17. This enables us to
conclude another component of research leading towards the Chapter ??. Note that, in
Flowchart 2.3.1 we observe that the basic demand of model estimation is derived from
out data structure and research objectives, this shall be sound basis of determining
any econometric modeling outcomes. We believe in what Angrist and Pischke (2008)
argues that the estimation of sound methods shall be preceded by sound objective
and data structure as guide. Nonetheless, the secondary survey of literature acts as
decisive input in finalizing the methodology in general, indeed making the research
16Results tables are in Appendix A.4
17Author would like to thank Professor Bertanha for his guidance and help in developing this section.
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as deductive reasoning which in turn, insists on citation as supporting argument. We
believe in formulating an informed model, even if it is ambiguous with our hypothesis,
keeping that the hypothesis are an expected outcome, but falsifying them only means
that we need to revise the whole analysis, in lieu of just rejecting them. The symbolic
as well as methodological approach of using flowchart is also an algorithmic notion of
research work, where true or false values are part and parcel of research agenda. In
our opinion, the research on conflict economic shall preview all possible methods (and
models) of analysis as this field, in words of Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) demands
an economics as it is in real world, which in itself is separate research challenge.
This section begins with scientific foundation of Poisson regression and then goes
on elaborating our data sources and estimation methods.In following Flowchart 2.3.1
we present a process of analysis of the count panel data. Note that, it took many
trial-and-error to-reach the possible conclusion of modeling, unlike conventional
panel data econometric, the count data demands a critical review of not just methods
but methodology of estimation too.
2.3.1 Scientific fundamentals for count data model
Count data is collection of non negative-integer, put together in temporal and spatial
variations it is pooled or longitudinal data, Cameron and Trivedi (2013) notes that
the longitudinal data is most preferable form of data analysis in discrete dependent
variables. A Poisson regression is nothing but optimization with the original metric
of variance components. Here, the variance components are near the boundary of
parameter space, scholars have considered using combinations of commands in Stata
to estimate these results. For instance, a population averaged model is demonstrated
in Preliminary models in Table A.4, it uses a population average moments to
provide alternative parameterizations of variance components. On Poisson regression,
we consider two-level model, where for a series of M independent clusters, and
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conditional on a set of random effects uj ,
P r(yij = y|xij ,uj) = exp(−µij)µyijupslopey!
For µij = exp(xijβ + zijuj), j = 1, . . . ,M clusters, with cluster j consisting of i = 1, . . . ,nj
observations. The responses are counts yij . The 1 × p row vector xij are the
covariates for the fixed effects, analogous to the covariates you would find in a
standard Poisson regression model, with regression coefficients (fixed effects) β. For
notational convenience here and throughout Stata-14 manual entry, we suppress the
dependence of yij on xij .The 1q vector zij are the covariates corresponding to the
random effects and can be used to represent both random intercepts and random
coefficients. For example, in a random-intercept model, zij is simply the scalar 1.
The random effects uj are M realizations from a multivariate normal distribution with
mean 0 and qq variance matrix Σ. The random effects are not directly estimated as
model parameters but are instead summarized according to the unique elements of
Σ, known as variance components. One special case of (1) places zij = xij so that
all co-variate effects are essentially random and distributed as multivariate normal
with mean βand variance Σ. This is basis of mixed–effects modeling, however,
before we enter into mathematical expression of the two-stage model, we would
like to consider a broader debate on what is Poisson distribution, its process and
estimation?, we ask a simple question, on our data, whether Poisson regression is
apt for it.We suggest that the mixed-effects is apt model, but one has to deal with
some outstanding issues highlighted below. We humbly note that, this is discussion
on two-stage model, which by removing a stage component, can be employed for
single stage or three stage by adding a suffix in script. In fact, the purpose of staged
or hierarchical modeling is to obtain a deeper estimation inference on our analysis.
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Poisson Distribution, Process, Estimation and Regression
The Poisson distribution is arguably most important distribution in mathematics( see
Blitzstein and Hwang (2014) and Montgomery and Runger (2010)) mainly because it
represents the natural data such as counting road accidents, riots, or heart patients
admitted in a year in hospital and so on. Now, lets move to technique of Poisson, for
P(X=k) it can take any positive integer value, i.e. unlike binomial it has no restrictive
limits of 0 to 1. The probability P can be measured as,
P (X = k) = e−µµkupslopek!
k⇒ {,1,2 . . .}
µ is positive real number, often called as rate parameter.The objective is to regress P,
given vector k co-variates with x explanatory variables. Winkelmann (2013) suggests
that the advantage of Poisson regression model (PRM) is that it explicitly recognizes
the non-negative integer character of the dependent variable. It has two components,
first a distributional assumption, and second a specification of the mean parameter as
a function of explanatory variables. Thus, a Poisson distribution is one parameter
distribution, i.e. parameter λ is equal to the mean and variance, and it must be
positive. Here, it is feasible to specify λ as an exponential function of index of the
explanatory variables x in order to account for observed heterogeneity: λ = exp(β1 +
β2x2 + · · · + βkxk) or in vector notation, λ = exp(xpβ). The exponential form ensure
that λ remains positive for all possible combinations of parameters and explanatory
variables. At this step, the systematic effects interact in multiplicative way, and the
coefficients j have the interpretation of a partial elasticity of E(y|x) with respect to (the
level of) xj if the logarithm of xj is included among the regressors. The model can be
generalized by including non-linear transformations of xj , for instance a higher order
polynomial, among the regressors(Winkelmann, 2013). We assume that independent
sample of pairs of observations (yi ,xi), the parameters of the model can be estimated
by the maximum likelihood. Cameron and Trivedi (2013),Winkelmann (2013) and
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Figure 2.1: Distributions properties Blitzstein and Hwang (2014)
Wooldridge (2015) argues that maximum likelihood is estimation for count regression
model. However, if one takes a step back, and think about the Rao (1945) original
paper on information and accuracy paradigm, we note that unbiased estimation largely
depends on data configuration. Silva and Tenreyro (2010) wrote a key paper arguing
that the existence of the maximum likelihood estimates in Poisson regression depends
on the data configuration. Silva and Tenreyro (2010) propose a strategy to identify
the existence of the problem and to single out the regressors causing it in using
Stata package called ppml – Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimation(Silva
and Tenreyro, 2011). Winkelmann (2013) in Chapter 3, on Poisson regression suggests
that maximum likelihood estimator β = argmaxL(β) is a general nonlinear function of
dependent variable. Thus, analytical results on small sample properties of distribution
of β is not available. Provided a number of regularity conditions are satisfied, it can
be shown that the maximum likelihood estimator is: 1) asymptotically unbiased, 2)
asymptotically normal and 3) asymptotically efficient.
ppml – Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimation
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ppml estimates Poisson regression by pseudo-maximum likelihood. It differs
from [R] poisson because it uses the method of ( see Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
Silva and Tenreyro (2010) and Silva and Tenreyro (2011)) to identify and drop
regressors that may cause the nonexistence of the (pseudo-) maximum likelihood
estimates. In this Chapter, the purpose is to check whether the specification resulting
from dropping the problematic regressors is interesting. We shall also note that
our results from mixed effects Poisson (and Negative Binomial) are key for the
objective, while ppml is review of these results, precisely to see a relationship
between inequality and conflicts variables.Note that, a Stata considers fact that
ppml shares many characteristics of the glm command, including its limitations.
Note that, it is asymptotically unbiased and because of mean squared error
convergence(consistent), as distribution converges at the true parameter value
centered at β0, Winkelmann (2013) suggests that it is asymptotically efficient, since
its variance is equal to the inverse of Fisher information, the Crame´r-Rao lower
bound for any unbiased estimator18Winkelmann (2013) continues that while these
asymptotic properties in a strict sense only hold in the limit of infinite sample size,
in practice they are often assumed to be approximately valid, especially when the
sample size is not that small. The approximate distribution of βˆ is then given by,
βˆML ∼ N (β0, [nI(β0)]−1). This, in practice, approximation is crucial step in estimation
of Poisson regression. Further, Winkelmann (2013) argues that an independent sample
of pairs of observations (yi ,xi), the parameters of model can be estimated by maximum
likelihood, even when first order conditions (of differentiation) are non–linear and
thus cannot be solved in close mathematical form. Stata module (in version 14)
employs number of in-built iterative algorithm to find maximization which is unique
as the log-likelihood function, by nature is globally concave. Winkelmann (2013) aptly
suggest under correct specification, these estimators has all the properties of maximum
18Lindsay (1988) gives the earliest and convenient account of this, in early parts of paper, where
later the composite likelihood or pseudo-likelihood are proposed as an adding together individual
component log likelihoods, each of which corresponds to a marginal or conditional event.
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likelihood estimators, except that the lack of a mean -independent determination of
variance for Poisson distribution contrast with conventional two parameter normal
distribution(in normal distribution variance is independently adjusted from the
mean). This result in Poisson regression being a restrictive estimation. Albeit,
both Cameron and Trivedi (2013) and Winkelmann (2013) argues that the Poisson
regression is robust: as much that the estimator β is consistent even if the variance
does not equal the mean, in other words, the distribution cannot be Poisson. Note
that, in earlier section we have suggested that Poisson regression estimators are valid
in nearly Poisson-like conditions, given that data is relatively small and conclusions
restrictive. In this Chapter, we conclude that the test of estimation of Poisson
regression, by and large, depends on data configuration, following Silva and Tenreyro
(2010) conclusion that non-existence of (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimation of
the Poisson regression models is more likely when the data has many zeros[p.311].
We have less zero in our dependent variable, 19. Similar recommendations are given
by Agarwal et al. (2002) and Baetschmann and Winkelmann (2017). We follow a
technique of Lawless (1987), Wang et al. (1998),Gibbons et al. (2008),Zhang et al.
(2017a), a mixed-effects model for our data, where the conditional distribution of the
response given the random effects is assumed to be Poisson.Additionally, we check the
pseudo maximum likelihood estimation to review our results.
Two-stage model for incidence of conflict
In a two-level Poisson model, for cluster j, j = 1, . . . , M, the conditional distribution
of yj = (yj1, . . . , yjnj )
′, given a set of cluster-level random effects uj , is;
f
(
yj
∣∣∣ uj) = nj∏
i=1
[{exp(xijβ+ zijuj)} yijexp {−exp(xijβ+ zijuj)}/ yij !
19please refer the variable incidence in Table 2.6
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In our model, cluster j is first state -level and second regional level variations. But
before that we have to maximize the equation; the probability β but using product
rule in first-order differentiation is untidy, we take log transformation, which will
also convert the product into summation, which in turn is easy to maximize under
first-order differentiation;
f (yj |uj)= exp [∑nji=1 { yij (xijβ + zijuj)− exp (xijβ + zijuj)− log( yij !)}]
Defining
(
yj
)
=
∑nj
i=1 log( yij
!), where c
(
yj
)
does not depend on the model parameters,
we can express the above compactly in matrix notation;
f (yj |uj) = exp{y ′j(Xjβj +Zjuj)− 1
′
exp(Xjβ +Zjuj)− c(yj)}
Where Xj is formed by staking the row vectors xij and Zj is formed by staking the
row vectors zij . We extend the definition of exp(.) to be a vector function where
necessary. Because the prior distribution of uj is multivariate normal with mean 0 and
q × q variance matrix ∑, the likelihood contribution for thejth cluster is obtained by
integrating uj out of the joint density f (yj |uj);
Lj(β,Σ) = (2pi)
−q/2|Σ|−1/2
∫
f (yj |uj)exp(−u ′j
∑−1
uj /2)duj
= exp{c(yj)}(2pi)−q/2|Σ|−1/2
∫
exp{h(β,Σ,uj)}duj
Where
h(β,Σ,uj) = y
′
j(Xjβ +Zjuj)1
′
exp(Xjβ +Zjuj)u
′
jΣ
−1uj /2
and for convenience, in the arguments of h(·) we suppress the dependence on the
observable data (yj ,Xj ,Zj).
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The integration in above equation has no close form, mainly due to exp, therefore
it shall be approximated. In the Multilevel mixed- effects Poisson regression we have
four approximation methods, mean–variance adoptive Gauss–Hermite quadrature is
default for random effect model in Stata20. In this Chapter, we follow do.file given
here, Chapter 2:do.file.
Poisson Paradigm and Conflict economics
The Poisson Paradigm is also called the law of rare event. The paradigm is fundamental
to our exploration of conflict economics, in fact, it is from this mathematical
foundations we shall begin our inference on conflict. for instance, consider an event
of C1 in count of events Ci where iε(1,2,3 · · · ), now in Poisson paradigm,when X is the
sum of many rare indicator ”mostly independent” random variables and µ = E[X], we
would like to say that X is close to a Poisson distribution with mean µ and, in particular,
that P r[X = 0] is nearly e−µ. This is a rough statement the Poisson Paradigm (Alon
and Spencer, 2004). Note that, besides a key characteristic that it is summation(not
integration) the paradigm is also about mostly independent events, which are almost
random. Blitzstein and Hwang (2014) suggests that the Poisson distribution gives a
good approximation under fairly flexible conditions, where the events does not have
to be independent, ultimately giving a large variety of events a Poisson distribution
like function. Now, in event C1 which followed by event C2 does not have to have
be related but in conflict economics, these events are in loose definitions of violent
contests or outbreak which may or may not have been influenced by each other directly.
However, they are certainly associated with same time-line of conflicts, for moment
assume that events C represents number of murders (in land-related conflicts), if a
unit murder occurred in some rural part of Bahia (Brazil) and second unit of murder
occurred in Santa Caterina (Brazil), in pragmatic perspective they have to be motivated
and activated by different perpetrator to their respective victims. Now, if one decide
20Please refer on-line Stata book for details: http://www.stata.com/manuals/
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to study a land-related violent in macro-economic understanding using the data
complied such as this Chapter 2 and Chapter ??, then a critical limitation for one
is to handle the data incoherence arising out of geographical as well as contextual
difference. Note that, in terms of statistical or econometric modeling this does not
constituents as major hindrance as in econometric method we assume a multi-variate
paradigm as stochastic uniform environment, but on fundamental theoretical level, it
is rather difficult for one to interpret these results in composite economic inference,
we have to take account of events as mutually independent but exhaustive not exclusive.
We argue that Poisson pardigm allows us to resolve the debates on generalized
inference, and therefore generalization in econometric analysis. Angrist and Pischke
(2008) argues similar formation in understanding difference –in–difference method
of estimation, we follow that the estimation of regression are to be tested on unit
specific inference vindication, for instance, even in broader assumption that one wish
to study land related conflicts , so we can assume that inter-personal or regional
exclusivity will not hinder our modeling objective, in the end, we need to construct
experimentalist account of econometric models. Baltagi (2008), Cameron and Trivedi
(2013) and Elhorst (2014) shall insist a similar tone in different approach of their
take on econometrics, we suggest that an experimentalist enlightening interpretation
of the β in the multivariate case exists and has relevant interpreting power. It was
originally formulated more than 70 years ago by Frisch and Waugh (1933), revived
by Lovell (1963), and implemented in applied econometrics by Angrist and Pischke
(2008) under the catchy phrase regression anatomy 21. In summary, the Poisson
paradigm concur the conflict economics in much deeper experimentalist ways than
as it is understood by many contemporary scholars.
21Filoso (2011) gives an intuitive account of how Stata module can help us to visualize it.
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Discrete vs. Continuous: some issues of estimation and inference
A random variable is a numerical variable whose measured value can change from
one replicate of the experiment to another Montgomery and Runger (2010).Random
variable may be called as discrete random with finite(as countable) set of real numbers
for its range, while it may be called as continuous random A discrete random variable
is a random variable with an interval (either finite or infinite) of real numbers for
its range.Now, fundamentally, in statistical terms, the inference i.e the probability in
case continuous variable is calculated with the probability density function, while for
discrete variables it is referred as probability mass function. We perceive a critical
distinction which roll over from probability functions, in continuous variables we
estimate a integration function while in discrete variables we estimate a summation
function. In practice, this results in great deal of limitation, although holds a critical
concern in multi-variate regression situation. Note that, we argue that mathematically
the estimation of count or event discrete random variable is best estimated using
Bayesian functions, but in practice there is no such requirement, mainly because lack
a posterior functions in research of conflicts. Nonetheless, it is prudent to highlight
that discrete variables enables us much wide array of mathematical computation
methods for instance in this Chapter 2 employs a multilevel mixed-effects models
[QR Decomposition] which (with even standard error mixed effects) estimates a
robust model to mis-specifications of the underlying distribution as long as the
conditional mean is correctly specified(see Wooldridge (2015) and Cameron and
Trivedi (2013)). Cameron and Trivedi (2013) begins their classic book by saying
that the univariate statistical model of event counts usually specifies a probability
distribution of the number of occurrences of the event known up to some parameters.
Estimation and inference in such models are concerned with the unknown parameters,
given the probability distribution and the count data. Such a specification involves
no other variables, and the number of events is assumed to be independently
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identically distributed (iid). Thus, in count regression model the role of covariates
(regressors) that are thought to affect the parameters of the conditional distribution
of events, given the covariates.In summary, the issues with count regression model
are fundamental to econometric inference debate, therefore aptly cited as critical by
almost all scholars. We suggest that the strong iid assumption enables to pursue a
non-linear model where axioms of estimations are directed by stochastic process up-to
certain time t as opposed to conventional Gaussian linear model’s finite t.
2.3.2 Data
The data in this Chapter have been collected from four main sources, the CPT,
PNAD, IPEA and FNP(Please refer A.1. Each variable is chosen based on the research
objective. The data was transformed and re-calibrated from different checks22. Note
that, on recommendation of Cameron and Trivedi (2013) and Baltagi (2008) we choose
to continue with the count data, instead transforming it into continuous log data. This
is mainly due to characteristic of data, firstly the count outcomes are non-negative (i.e
i≥0) integer value, therefore the log transformation shall skew the distribution order.
Secondly, the discrete data when transformed into log form ceases to be event model.
Table A.1 gives names and descriptions of variables considered in this analysis. Table
A shows how the multiple measurements of inequality are calculated. Table 2.6 shows
how data on conflicts are distributed in, along-with Figure 2.2 shows the Poisson-like
distribution of conflict data.
22Professor Marden wrote a paper on Take What You Can: Property Rights,Contestability and
Conflict(Fetzer and Marden (2016)). He shared his data with us, this enabled us to counter-check our
compilation on main variables of conflicts. Author would like to express gratitude for his help.
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Table 2.3: Data description and sources
Variables Description Source Abbreviation
X Coordinates longitude IPEA Geodata xcoord
Y Coordinates latitude IPEA Geodata ycoord
State ID state id for 27 states IPEA Geodata id
Year year for 2004-2014 time
Violence attempted murders+murders CPT violence
Escalation threatened with eviction+ expulsion+death threats + murders CPT escalation
Incidences number of conflicts +number of displacement CPT incidences
Dislocation and dispossession families driven out+evicted+destroyed houses+ rocas+ goods+banditry CPT dislocation & dispossession
Number of Families number of families in incidences CPT families
Area area under disputes or conflicts CPT area
Overall GINI overall gini PNAD gini
GINI within groups within group GINI PNAD wgini
GINI between groups between group gini PNAD bgini
Polarization index 1 Silber et al. index PNAD p1
Polarization index 2 Wolfson index PNAD p2
Polarization index 3 Zhang & Kanbur index PNAD p3
Polarization index 4 DER index PNAD p4,p4a and p4b
Average Land Prices average land price FNP av land price
Urbanization urbanization rate PNAD urban
Agrarian labor agriculture dependence PNAD agriculture
Industrial labor industrial dependence PNAD industrial
Measuring Polarization and GINI Index
Income distribution analysis23 has extensive literature,some key references are
Duclos et al. (2004), Esteban and Ray (1994) and Van Kerm (2009b). We consider
broad picture of approaches on understanding income distribution which can be
seen from two perspectives, one is measuring a distributional density functions of
sample data and second is to study and explore a population data.In this Chapter
we focus on nine types of measures of income distribution analysis, mainly because
our approach is to focus on analytical part of these distributions while keeping a
part of multifaceted aspects of distributional density. The purpose is to achieve a
rational inference out of all these measures. According to Van Kerm (2009b) the
GINI coefficient has also been used as a building block of several measures of income
bi-polarization. We follow Chakravarty (1988) extended measure of GINI, further
developed by Van Kerm (2009b) and Chakravarty and Maharaj (2015). The GINI
measure is assumed as a covariance expression (see Yitzhaki (1998) and Yitzhaki and
23For reference see Van Kerm (2009b),Van Kerm (2009a) and Araar and Duclos (2007)
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Schechtman (2012))24.The concept(from Van Kerm (2009b)) is that we arrange PNAD
income data by individuals in population in increasing order of income and divide it
in two equal-sized groups: the poor are individuals with an income below the median
and the rich are those with income above the median. Measures of bi-polarization
capture the distance between these two groups. We denote the median M(Y ), mean
income µ(Y ), mean income among the poor µ(Y P ), mean income among the rich µ(Y R),
the GINI coefficient among the poor GINI (Y P ), the GINI coefficient among the rich
GINI (Y R) and the overall GINI, GINI(Y ). In a classic paper Silber et al. (2007) show
that several measures of bi-polarization can be expressed in terms of within-group
GINI and between-group GINI which can be written in this situation as:
Within(Y P ,Y R) =
1
4
(µY PµY
)
GINI(Y P ) +
(
µY R
µY
)
GINI(Y R)
 (2.1)
Between(Y P ,Y R) =
1
4
(µY RµY
)
− (
(
µY P
µY
) (2.2)
P1 =
Between(Y P ,Y R)−Within(Y P ,Y R)
GINI(Y )
(2.3)
P2 = Between(Y
P ,Y R)−Within(Y P ,Y R) µY
Med(Y )
(2.4)
P3 =
Betweeen(Y P ,Y R)
Within(Y P ,Y R)
(2.5)
GINI(X) = −2Cov
 Xµ(X) , (1−F(X)
 (2.6)
P4
25 =DER(α) =
"
f (x)1+αf (y)|y − x|dydx (2.7)
24In terms of statistical methodology, measuring GINI is crucial step which has at least four main
approaches of measurement. We suggest that the purpose of analysis is one key interest factor to narrow
down the measurement approach. Yitzhaki and Schechtman (2012) And Yitzhaki and Schechtman
(2005) gave an excellent survey of all these approaches, for statistical aspect Chakravarty and Maharaj
(2015) and Chakravarty (2015) gives an elaborate account. Note that, measuring GINI is crucial step in
our analysis, therefore we shall mention that using same income distribution data, if one changes the
approach, index value may or may not differ in a bit, however we assume that this occurs mainly due to
approach difference not from data processing errors.
25Polarization index from Duclos et al. (2004) gives two componenents of alineation and
identification,for within and between groups, we consider a combined index in our analysis.Table 2.4
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Table 2.4: Summary of inequality measures
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
gini 270 0.49961 0.043615 0.409769 0.642875
wgini 270 0.232457 0.080934 0.133522 0.576954
bgini 270 0.416746 0.145387 0.236578 0.966836
p1 270 0.365592 0.114282 0.170256 0.762753
p2 270 0.278622 0.043015 0.214058 0.481979
p3 270 1.792983 0.107911 1.467966 2.07703
p4 270 .4180281 .0778527 .256 .6529
p4a 270 .5595119 .0632654 .4378 .7478
p4b 270 .8950081 .1123251 .6296 1.201
Table 2.5: Summary of conflict measures
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 297 2008.966 3.167435 2004 2014
Violence 264 2.674242 5.344406 0 34
Escalations 193 1607.155 1826.446 0 10000
Incidences of conflicts 262 67.87023 62.56894 3 381
Dispossession & dislocation 95 4972.758 4859.787 0 23166
Families in conflict 262 7832.336 10350.23 240 127756
The calculation of all these measures is from PNAD data for income, we consider
survey data from 2004 to 2014. Stata computation (version 14) was used with
two packages DASP Araar and Duclos (2007)and sginiVan Kerm (2009b). The
summary of indices’s given in Table 2.4.The Figure 2.3 shows a deficit curves and
generalized Lorenz curves for aggregate income data of Brazil, from year 2004 to
2014. These distributive measures in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.4 are defined in terms
of integrals over range of percentile26.The Figure 2.3 gives a summary of sample
(from PNAD) distribution, we observe that Between − group(Equation2.2) and Bi −
polarization(Equation2.3) explains higher inequality gaps in comparison to Overall −
GINI(Equation2.6). The analysis suggests that the income distribution has bi-polarity
with high income gaps in two group of income. Note that, the different measure of
shows summary of all three polarization indices.
26This is familiar procedure for continuous distribution analysis, see Duclos and Araar (2007) and
Chakravarty (2015).
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polarization are able to capture different nature of same distribution, this suggests
that individual in given sample has social distance based on income gaps in groups as
well as between groups but relative deprivation is lower within groups. Polarization
indices’s present a closer look at distribution where axiomatic difference has more
subtle interpretation in theory27. However, this Chapter focus on its implication on
conflicts. We will explore them more in details in analysis section of this Chapter28
27Note that, a concept of polarization has varied meaning and inference, one can measure these in
relative of social or welfare based polarization between groups. In this Chapter, we have narrow down
a focus on analysis of polarization as relative depreciation and its impact on conflicts. Please refer,
Chakravarty (2015) for more details on deconstruction of measure of inequality.
28Foster et al. (1984) and Foster et al. (2010) considers a composite index, called FGT on poverty
metrics, we employ these for our argument on between group inequality and conflicts hypothesis. Note
that, FGT index for α as 2 is higher weight on the poverty of the poorest individuals, making it a
combined measure of poverty.
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2.4 Results and Analysis
We follow the Flowchart 2.3.1 in order to obtain three stages of results,
first we have given a preliminary results on Population-avergaed (PA),
fixed-effects(FE),random-effects(RE), and between-effects(BE) in Table A.4. The
results ambiguous on key variables of inequality, land conflicts and land prices.
Although, we observe a good estimation results, in following Poisson-fixed-effects in
Table A.5 and Table A.7. These estimations are highly significant for the Poisson-panel
model, however, the value α is significantly more than 0, so we move to Negative
binomial-panel where we observe ambiguous results in key variables. Note that, there
is possibility that we are getting a mixed-effects significance. Thus, we move to test
the mixed-effects modeling. There are two main reasons, we move towards multi-level
model as our research objective demands a inquiry into inequality–conflict paradigm,
which shall be guided from data configurations. There are two level of clusters,
one on state-level and regional. The mixed-effects model guides us to consider the
distributions for the response conditional on normally distributed effects. The results
presented are categorized in two sections, one mixed effects Poisson model, followed
by QR decomposition method and re calibration using ppml estimations. Note that,
our main estimation are mixed-effects multi-level Poisson model.
Results
The Table 2.7 shows results of Multilevel mixed-effects Poisson regression. The results
are obtained using Stata command mepoisson. The consolidated results are output
of Flowchart 2.3.1, which employs preliminary models for count data to estimate the
possible relationship between interest variable. Resulting, in a final choice of model is
based on secondary readings and data structures.
CHAPTER 2. PANEL COUNT DATA ANALYSIS 99
Ta
bl
e
2.
7:
M
u
lt
il
ev
el
m
ix
ed
-e
ffe
ct
s
Po
is
so
n
re
gr
es
si
on
P
re
d
ic
to
r
va
ri
ab
le
:I
nc
id
en
ce
of
co
nfl
ic
ts
In
cid
en
ce
×p
1
In
cid
en
ce
×p
2
In
cid
en
ce
×p
3
In
cid
en
ce
×p
4
In
cid
en
ce
×p
4a
In
cid
en
ce
×p
4b
In
cid
en
ce
×w
gin
i
In
cid
en
ce
×b
gin
i
In
cid
en
ce
×gi
ni
Va
ria
ble
M
od
el
1
M
od
el
2
M
od
el
3
M
od
el
4
M
od
el
5
M
od
el
6
M
od
el
7
M
od
el
8
M
od
el
9
In
eq
ua
lit
ym
ea
su
res
0.4
1.2
48
*
-0
.44
2*
**
0.1
79
1.0
55
*
0.0
65
3
1.4
11
***
1.4
01
***
1.3
10
**
-0
.34
3
-0
.70
2
-0
.15
9
-0
.26
5
-0
.54
6
-0
.16
8
-0
.28
1
-0
.25
3
-0
.51
9
Fa
mi
lie
si
nc
on
fli
cts
4.9
3e
-0
5*
**
4.9
8e
-0
5*
**
5.4
0e
-0
5*
**
5.0
7e
-0
5*
**
5.0
5e
-0
5*
**
5.0
6e
-0
5*
**
5.5
4e
-0
5*
**
5.4
1e
-0
5*
**
5.2
1e
-0
5*
**
-3
.10
E-
06
-2
.97
E-
06
-3
.21
E-
06
-2
.97
E-
06
-2
.95
E-
06
-2
.99
E-
06
-3
.11
E-
06
-3
.01
E-
06
-3
.02
E-
06
Di
slo
ca
tio
n&
Di
sp
os
ses
sio
n
-2
.37
e-0
5*
**
-2
.82
e-0
5*
**
-3
.95
e-0
5*
**
-2
.89
e-0
5*
**
-3
.08
e-0
5*
**
-2
.85
e-0
5*
**
-4
.26
e-0
5*
**
-3
.75
e-0
5*
**
-3
.47
e-0
5*
**
-9
.01
E-
06
-8
.21
E-
06
-9
.19
E-
06
-8
.31
E-
06
-8
.33
E-
06
-8
.31
E-
06
-8
.70
E-
06
-8
.35
E-
06
-8
.61
E-
06
Es
ca
lat
ion
of
co
nfl
ict
s
2.1
4E
-0
5
2.4
2e
-0
5*
2.6
8e
-0
5*
*
2.3
5e
-0
5*
2.5
9e
-0
5*
2.3
2e
-0
5*
2.7
6e
-0
5*
*
2.5
4e
-0
5*
2.7
1e
-0
5*
*
-1
.37
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
-1
.36
E-
05
Vi
ole
nc
ei
nc
id
en
ce
s
0.0
05
83
**
0.0
05
68
**
0.0
05
30
**
0.0
05
70
**
0.0
05
63
**
0.0
05
68
**
0.0
04
06
*
0.0
03
96
*
0.0
05
38
**
-0
.00
23
8
-0
.00
23
8
-0
.00
23
9
-0
.00
23
9
-0
.00
23
9
-0
.00
24
-0
.00
24
-0
.00
24
-0
.00
23
9
Ur
ba
ni
za
tio
n
-0
.00
72
4*
**
-0
.00
88
5*
**
-0
.00
66
4*
**
-0
.00
67
6*
**
-0
.00
74
6*
**
-0
.00
68
5*
**
-0
.00
55
3*
*
-0
.00
59
0*
**
-0
.00
74
8*
**
-0
.00
21
7
-0
.00
23
5
-0
.00
21
7
-0
.00
22
7
-0
.00
21
7
-0
.00
23
7
-0
.00
21
8
-0
.00
21
6
-0
.00
21
6
Ag
ra
ria
nL
ab
or
-0
.01
19
***
-0
.01
42
***
-0
.00
86
4*
**
-0
.01
09
***
-0
.01
61
***
-0
.00
99
2*
**
-0
.01
51
***
-0
.02
06
***
-0
.01
37
***
-0
.00
35
8
-0
.00
39
6
-0
.00
31
2
-0
.00
35
-0
.00
45
-0
.00
31
1
-0
.00
32
8
-0
.00
36
6
-0
.00
34
7
In
du
str
ial
La
bo
r
-0
.05
23
***
-0
.05
24
***
-0
.04
87
***
-0
.05
33
***
-0
.05
50
***
-0
.05
24
***
-0
.04
89
***
-0
.05
07
***
-0
.05
12
***
-0
.00
74
6
-0
.00
74
8
-0
.00
75
4
-0
.00
78
7
-0
.00
76
8
-0
.00
77
1
-0
.00
74
9
-0
.00
74
7
-0
.00
74
7
Co
ns
tan
t
5.0
54
***
5.0
39
***
5.8
32
***
5.0
77
***
4.7
51
***
5.0
68
***
4.7
64
***
4.6
81
***
4.5
91
***
-0
.24
7
-0
.24
4
-0
.34
1
-0
.25
6
-0
.31
2
-0
.30
4
-0
.24
7
-0
.24
9
-0
.32
2
Id
(St
ate
)
0.2
57
***
0.2
69
***
0.2
68
***
0.2
63
***
0.2
74
***
0.2
62
***
0.2
63
***
0.2
65
***
0.2
71
***
-0
.07
74
-0
.08
05
-0
.08
05
-0
.07
9
-0
.08
22
-0
.07
85
-0
.07
91
-0
.07
99
-0
.08
12
Ob
ser
va
tio
ns
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
Nu
mb
er
of
gr
ou
ps
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
Sta
nd
ar
de
rro
rs
in
pa
ren
th
ese
s
***
p<
0.0
1,*
*p
<0
.05
,*
p<
0.1
100
2.4.1 Analysis
Directly contested resources
We observe a significant relationship of interest between land conflict incidence and
income polarization.The key insight we get is that, conflict between similar groups
and between groups are predominantly influenced by each others’ income levels. The
land as directly contested resource is key in formation of these conflicts. Consequently,
the land manifests into–same resources and multiple functions.In Brazil, historically
landed resources have been point of contention, our analysis shows that it has
evolved into dynamic contradiction of capital via income (and wealth) inequalities
directly influencing land conflicts. In such an economy, the growth led development
has generated the state apparatus that prefers one function of the land over other.
Therefore, the agrarian jobs in negative proportion to that of incidence of conflicts
mainly due to negative labor intensive growth, while industrial job shows negative
relation due to selective labor intensive growth. This suggest that there exist a
large pool of unemployed, perhaps semi-skilled and disaggregated class of workers.
Wolford (2003a) suggest that the landless labor is backbone of the land economy and
politics. Our analysis agrees in corroboration, however, we suggest that the landless
labor is visible in families involved in conflict as positive variation with incidences.
Thus, the working class has disproportionate share of lower income and conflicts
led by income polarization.The notion of directly contested resources enables us to
interpret our results that incidence of conflict is often accompanied by escalation
of conflict. We argue that the conflict, once occurred, is almost always used by its
perpetrator as tool of escalation. This can be observed in rising threats and other
bodily or mental harms inflicted on lower income groups. The maps below shows us
a spatial concentration of land conflicts, where incidences of conflicts is accumulated
phenomenon with dispossession, dislocation, escalation and violence.
Now the relationship between polarization and conflict seems like
identical-opposite unity. Although it has been overestimated within given limits
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of economic studies, it shall be held as one inherent category of human historical
understanding itself, which is grounded in the historically specific form of life.
Further the anti-thesis of the unity in economics is concrete form of life which is
contradictory to historically specific form. Hence, in Marx (1993) the thesis-antithesis
of being of such unity gives an exposition of reality which is grounded in historical
form and yet their synthesis is –this movement– into and apart from each other, in
other words becoming. In other words the being of, say, capital is nothing but becoming
of capital. Therefore, this unity, is about, becoming and certainly not being of capital.
In line with this, we read a seminal work on the Violence and Social Order; North et al.
(2005) which argued that,violence must be near the heart of any explanation of how
societies behave. The necessary prerequisite for forming durable large social groups is
a way to control violence. Natural states do not deal with violence by consolidating
control over it. Instead, utilizing the dispersion of violence in the population, they
create a pattern of interlocking economic, religious, political, and social interests
that provide powerful individuals with incentives not to use violence. All states are
organizations of organizations. Rent-creation combines with the internal structure of
organizations with the dominant coalition to limit violence in a natural state (2009,
pp. 258).
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Dispersion violence and becoming of capital has close ties with each other, in
words, Marx (1993) appropriable resources was one of the earliest condition of
violence in society. This has been reiterated by many, to name a few, Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Banerjee et al. (2001). Others
have argued polarization and conflict has a concrete relationship over and done with
uneven economic growth Mitra and Ray (2014), whereas some other argues that
poverty traps has close ties with the dispersion of violence in society, examples such
Metal Workers Protests in Sa˜o Paulo, 2013 and Tapajo´s Protest, 2005 were similar
episodes. In summery, Ray and Esteban (2017) has given an account for reasoning
in economics for dispersion of violence through, following as a case in illustration: an
incomplete information; the absence of transfers or incentives; limited commitment
in equal or unequal exchanges; dynamics as well as the credibility of economic cost
and internalized costs with the multiplicity of threats29.However, all these links
go back to fundamental inequality as key exposition for conflict. It is against this
backdrop, this chapter seeks to achieve three goals; first, the chapter provides a unique
attempt to address the major cleavages in Brazilian society, namely, income based
inequality measures. Secondly, we consider conflict as a form of violence, historically
grounded in a form of separation and difference, among and between the groups. The
chapter conceives this form of separation and difference as a manifestation of social
oppression, economic exclusion and political exploitation. Lastly, we argues that these
manifestations, forming regressive development conditions among and between the
groups. These are elaborated in details in next section.
Groups in Conflicts and Resources in Conflict
The inequality between and within the groups is crucial impact factor on conflicts.
Figure 2.6 shows how between group inequality is consistently higher than within
29See Ross (2006) explaining relation between Civil war and resource; Varshney ( 2002) focus on
unequal exchange and information in case of civil riots in India; and Wilkinson (2000) looks poverty
traps and conflict relation in India.
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(a) Dislocation and Dispossession (b) Escalation
(c) Incidence (d) Violence
Figure 2.5: Pareto graph, CPT data,2004-2014
group, however, in terms of values these are still high inequality gini indices.
Note that, the directly contested resources often led to between group coercion and
fractionation, additionally, we demonstrate that within group inequality fuses aversion
within group. Naturally, both has positive dependence with incidence of conflicts.
Figure 2.7 shows that how mirror equivalence of market and society interacts in
complex systems of economy. Each component accredits to a certain functions in
economy. Therefore, it enables us to explore the complex derivation of financial
interventions in household economics. In study of land conflicts, note that households,
both land-owner and land-less are in household and firm interactions. However, the
land-less has limited access to banks, that is limited access to credit or insurance in
market. This generates a dynamic conflict over the time, which Acemoglu (1996)
suggest as increasing social return on accumulation or accretion of wealth or income.
In our research, we observe that the income polarization impacts on land conflicts via
two distinct ways, one where income concentration positively influence conflicts while
income dispersion has ambiguous relationship. On level of real economy, the assets
CHAPTER 2. PANEL COUNT DATA ANALYSIS 105
Figure 2.6: Between-group[orange] and Within-group[blue] GINI index,PNAD
data,2004-2014
or commodities are directly influenced by income or wealth level which results into
household with asymmetric interaction with firms. For instance, Barros et al. (2012)
suggest that soybean concentration in central Brazil has led to monopolization of firm
interaction with large farmers, here, the limited access of familiar agrarian system
generates a unequal exchange and asymmetric power regime in food market. Thus,
ultimately leading to lack of access, nested resources and between group conflicts. We
shall understand that the Monterey level interactions are critical for land-less farmers,
mainly because of their dependence on monetary interaction, first for food security
and second for livelihood security.We argue that the Figure 2.7 shows the complex
society of Brazilian landed economy, where the emergence of conflict is non-linear,
particularly because of reigning concentration of income and wealth in hands of a few.
In directly contested resources, the between group and within group conflicts
are market-driven as we observe Figure 2.7 shows that commodity producing labor
power gets its meaning from consumption, repayments and wages in monetary levels.
Thus, making a question of income (and income inequality) a self-contentious question
in macro-economic of land conflicts. There are, indeed, many factors influencing
this dynamic, such as land inequality Alston et al. (2009), land governance Reydon
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Figure 2.7: Complexity in market and households of land economy
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et al. (2015), land power groups in politics Deininger and Byerlee (2011) and social
organization of land-less Wolford (2015). We propose that a key lesson from this
chapter is inter-linkage of monetary level interaction with real level of economy. This
is concrete meaning of income inequality influencing the core of land conflicts.
Complexity and conflict cycles
We demonstrate that the income inequality has positive variation with land conflict,
however, we shall insist on a crucial interpretation of this evidence. The econometric
evidence hangs into two associated and opposite notions of interpretation. One is that
of phenomenon of conflict reduced to number has to be reveled as phenomenon and
second regression, as demonstrated in advanced econometric model, shall be guided
by the hermetical i.e. interpretive and institutive method of phenomenon. These are
CHAPTER 2. PANEL COUNT DATA ANALYSIS 107
two notions guiding us to be fall short in concluding that inequality, of any sort, must
spill-over into violent conflicts. Nonetheless, the conclusions are important in terms
of macro-economic scruples to chalk out policy recommendations. Here, we engage
into debate of functionalism in macro-economic system: the complexity and conflict.
Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014) argues that cyclical conflicts spirals start as a result of
misperceptions but also contain the seeds of their own dissolution. We extend that the
conflict spiral, often emerge from mis-information and mis-allocation of and about
resources. The research on conflict is ontological to mis-information, therefore we
shall begin in framwrok of complexity economics. Complexity economics shall be
seen as opposite to an economy that is not dead, static, timeless, and perfect, but one
that is alive, ever-changing, organic, and full of messy vitality (Arthur, 2013). This
advices us to move away from conventional econometric interpretations, instead we
suggest that long term evolution of conflict may guide us to demonstrate a spiral of
conflicts. Thus, for us, the endogenous non-equilibrium becomes a crucial point of
departure as opposite to equilibrium narratives. We suggest that count regression
model suggest a causal model of tendency towards endogenous non-equilibrium. In
summary, the chapter significantly succeed in demonstrating the relationship between
income inequality and conflict. However, we must insist that the nonequilibrium is
the natural state of the economy, which results into conflicts via mortal externalities of
micro-foundation of current production systems. One such a foundation is high wealth
and income concentration. And therefore the economy is always open to reaction,
often a violent reactions. This is not merely because of outside shocks or external
influences, but because nonequilibrium arises endogenously in the economy. There
are two main reasons for this. One is fundamental (or Knightian) uncertainty, the
other is technological innovation. Acemoglu (2002) demonstrates the technology led
changes, we succeed in a writing a solid evidence of creation of conflicts. We must
end this chapter, by asserting Schumpeter’s famous argument that there is a source of
energy within the economic system which would of itself disrupt any equilibrium that
might be attained Schumpeter and Backhaus (2003). We need a governmental system
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to accompany that disruptions.
2.5 Conclusion
[Secondly (they have a way of speaking in their language to call men
the half of one another), that they had observed that] there were amongst
us men full and crammed with all manner of commodities, whilst, in the
meantime, their halves were begging at their doors, lean and half-starved
with hunger and poverty; and they thought it strange that these necessitous
halves were able to suffer so great an inequality and injustice, and that they
did not take the others by the throats, or set fire to their houses.
–Brazilian Indian on their view on most remarkable about traveling France
in 1562. 30
We confront the same questions, as did by Brazilian Indian traveling through alleys
of Paris in 1562. The starved reaching to throats of well-fed is however outrage of
reactionary and non-pragmatic sort. We, on contrary, suggest that, ironically, Brazilian
Indian traveling contemporary Sa˜o Paulo might confront the same outrage. Albeit,
reaching to throats and firing houses became a reality in Paris as revolution of 1689 broke
out within a century of Brazilian Indian’s revelation. Contemporary land conflicts
suggest us that it is violence inflicted by owners of houses to house-less, and owner
of land to landless. The violence unfolding since last 40 years, undeniably suggesting
hints of the civil war between haves and have not.This thesis highlights that the onus
of land violence lays equally on its inflictors, in the rural as well as urban wealth
dwellers. The complex notion of land inequality, we posit, has intricate relation with
Sa˜ o Paulo stock exchange and commodity exchange too, nonetheless this might be
topic of research in itself.
30In 1562, Montaigne met a small group of Indians from Brazil (the subject of his essay, On
Cannibals) and asked them what they found most remarkable about their visit to France.Read, http:
//www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3586/pg3586-images.html
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The Chapter 2 shows how income polarization and inequality invokes landed
conflicts in Brazil. Our conclusions are robust and validated by secondary resources.
The significant contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate a cohesive relation
between inequality induced conflict. We conclude that the so called ambiguous
relationship between inequality and conflict has to be seen in many different method,
first to check its validity in long term and second to demonstrate a historicity of such
phenomenon.
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Chapter 3
Summary
The task of a critique of violence can be summarized as that of
expounding its relations to law and justice. For a cause, however effective,
becomes violent, in the precise sense of the word, only when it enters into
moral relations (. . . )
Walter Benjamin in Critique of Violence (Benjamin, 1986)
Grief describes a pattern of which recurs, with different variation in
weave of our life .
Wittgenstein on Philosophical investigations (LArrington, 2006)
The research summary has dual purpose, firstly to summarize the argument
of research and secondly, to reflect on prospects and potentials of research. The
thesis shows that there is significant relationship between income inequality and
land conflicts. These conclusions are resolving a critical debate, at least partially,
that income inequality has complex influence on land conflicts. We give a critical
evidence in line of recent work by Boushey (2017) which compiled a volume of leading
scholars responding on inequality, alongside a key understanding of macro-economic
perspective of conflicts as proposed by Ronald Findlay (2017) in frontier economics
and Atkinson (2015) on inequality and macroeconomics. In terms of significance of
CHAPTER 3. SUMMARY 111
research, we shall ascertain that reproducible evidence in inequality–conflict paradigm
is necessary and timely contribution to development economics.
We began with a fair objective in mind, as, to study land conflicts. In summary,
we argue the conflicts seems to be aggression which manifests itself in different form
such as the oppression, the exclusion, the exploitation and so on. Each of these terms
originated in complex notion of inequalities, of wealth and income. In Brazil, these
inequalities are meaning arising out of the historic forms of aggression, and therefore
it is critical form of violence, as it happened to be grounded in history, and it is
also more plausible form of violence. The research argued that this land conflict
is regression, not only in economic (and therefore in materialist) form, but also in
ideological character. In Chapter 1 we presented wide array of theoretical debates with
foci as land conflict, in relation with key objective addressing the questions of –the
development–the landed conflicts. The thesis is demarcated on the lines of addressing
the question of conflicts, governmentality and development through a unique research
questions. In Chapter 2, the researcher narrowed down understanding of conflicts to
economic theories, where, the meaning of economic theory in its relation with violence
was investigated. The chapter concluded that there are three main economic theories
on which violent possibilities are determined, first is individual economic preferences,
second is marginal cost and opportunity cost, and third is utility principle. Besides
that we posit that the relationship between general equilibrium and price theory as
statuette of conflict in economic. The thesis established that this form of violence,
occurring day to day basis, could be deterred not only through conventional approach
of policing but also with the help of negotiations.
In Mixed effects Poisson model, as regression method, the dissertation addressed
the semiotic relationships between the conflicts and the development vis--vis, the
conflict and the inequality (in terms of the income polarization) debates. In holistic
argument, we suggest that the individual marginal cost and opportunity are in relation
with conflicts, then it is rather plausible to inquire about day to day police order and
conflict relations, in which both the sides, the state as legitimate usurper of violence
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and the conflict on the other hand, as an illegitimate usurper, behavior in concord with
their marginal and opportunity cost. The state attempts to preserve its hegemony over
violence as legitimate mean and other side does the opposite. In response, the Chapter
2, undertook debates on rather, innovative approach of focusing on conflict as means
of development of inequality. Informing for the fact, that conflict as means does not
pretense the perpetual peace as end, but in exalt self-reflexive method, the researcher
continuous argument of perpetual peace.
We demonstrated that the state as a legitimate usurper of violence often perceives
the concept of development as demobilizing the character of the political origin
of violence, where the individual inequality are model according not only their
ideological but policy preferences too. Hence the conflict between landless faction
and the Brazilian state can be closely observed as socioeconomic conflict, instead
as popularly claimed as ideological conflict. This research left us with question
of whether the conflicts are prominently motivated by socio-economic identities (as
offshoot of socio-economic indicators) and the welfare ideology is often challenged
by the people and inflated by the state in case of public goods provisions. In order
to investigate further relation of conflict and divisions in society, the researcher
undertook the research of ethnic divisions and its exposition with conflicts.
In summary we give three key insights, although incompletely explored in this
thesis, we insist that the research shall include them as critical possibilities of research
in future.
Militarization of landed property
We observe that there is has been growing militarization of landed property in Brazil.
This leads to confounding question of whether a civil war? In our humble opinion,
the contemporary land conflicts does exhibit a traits of civil war, in terms of long term
evolution and historicity of conflict. There is large number of families and individuals
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involved on both sides of land-owner and land-less. However, the fringes are not
clearly defined as one might understand using conventional language of civil war.
We propose a invitation of research which shall take long-term understanding of this
phenomenon to reach to conclusion of whether civil war. Meanwhile, this research
insist on highlighting the militarization as threat to civil and democratic life.
Competition and Control of land and people
Observe the trends of land valorization in Brazil in Figure 3.1, one can associate a
rising land prices with loci of land conflicts by observations. We posit that there is
complex organism of land economy in works to operationalize the accumulation of
land via accretion of land conflicts. However, we must shay aways from generalized
claims, instead we propose a possible research objective for through research agenda
on land economy.
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Unanswered question: wither ethnicization?
One key question which is not addressed here is that of identity, mainly of race and
ethnicity in Brazil. This is because the Brazilian society is historical evolution of
complex identities, it is different challenge of researcher to aggregate the differences
and language of difference. Sullivan (2013) wrote a perspective on ethnicity in
land conflicts in Brazil. The research is good account of anthropological study,
however, for macro-study of Brazil, one has to begin in complex sections of history,
migration–immigration and labor study of last century. We choose to highlight this
critical subjects as necessary inquiry for future prospects.
3.1 Grievance, Negotiations and Civil resolutions
In recommendation of resolution, we suggest repatriate mechanism of grievance,
negotiations and civil resolutions. We argue that land conflicts is intergenerational
inflictions, if left unattained, might lead to full-scale internal war. Our opinion is
based on two stylized facts, one the land conflict is sustained pattern of contest for
more than forty years now. Second, the state operates as third party usurper and not
as mediator in many cases, which is unsustainable for democratic resolution. In order
to attain equilibrium, one has to enter into negotiation between haves and have not
of this society. Lastly, we suggest that large scale or personalized violence shall be
resolved and subsumed via civil society and state led resolutions.
On Similar lines, if we read the World Bank Report on, Conflict, Security and
Development (2011) which states more rigorous analysis. The report succeeds in
pursuing both violence as well as development debates. This has been partly because
of a change in direction to the inquiry. Rather than exploring for some systemic
outcome of socioeconomic indicators for economic growth and decline in violence,
the report, focused on the effect of conflict on development. From end to end
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first arguing a human capital mechanism (under violence) and political mechanism
(under underdevelopment) it has been argued that conflict stiffen the investments
and therefore slows the development. The report focus on repeated cyclical violence
(The World Bank, 2011, p. 55), thus the outbreak of conflicts essentially gets treated
as historical specific phenomenon. Looking across themes and experiences drawn
from around the world to offer some ideas and practical recommendations on how
to move beyond conflict and fragility and secure development. The key messages are
important for all countrieslow, middle, and high incomeas well as for regional and
global institutions (The World Bank, 2011):
• Institutional legitimacy is the key to stability. When state institutions do
not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to
justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities
have lost social cohesion–the likelihood of violent conflict increases. At the
earliest stages, countries often need to restore public confidence in basic
collective action even before rudimentary institutions can be transformed. Early
wins–actions that can generate quick, tangible results–are critical.
• Investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs is essential for reducing violence.
But there are major structural gaps in our collective capabilities to support
these areas. There are places where fragile states can seek help to build an
army, but we do not yet have similar resources for building police forces or
corrections systems. We need to put greater emphasis on early projects to create
jobs, especially through the private sector. The report provides insight into the
importance of the involvement of women in political coalitions, security and
justice reform, and economic empowerment.
• Confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change.
International agencies and partners from other countries must adapt procedures
so they can respond with agility and speed, a longer-term perspective, and
greater staying power. Assistance needs to be integrated and coordinated;
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multi-donor trust funds have proven useful in accomplishing these aims while
lessening the burdens of new governments with thin capacity. We need a better
hand-off between humanitarian and development agencies. And we need to
accept a higher level of risk: If legislatures and inspectors expect only the upside,
and just pillory the failures, institutions will steer away from the most difficult
problems and strangle themselves with procedures and committees to avoid
responsibility. This Report suggests some specific actions and ways of measuring
results.
• We need to adopt a layered approach. Some problems can be addressed at
the country level, but others need to be addressed at a regional level, such
as developing markets that integrate insecure areas and pooling resources for
building capacity. Some actions are needed at the global level, such as building
new capacities to support justice reform and the creation of jobs; forging
partnerships between producer and consumer countries to stem the illegal
trafficking; and acting to reduce the stresses caused by food price volatility.
• In adopting these approaches, we need to be aware that the global landscape is
changing. Regional institutions and middle income countries are playing a larger
role. This means we should pay more attention to south-south and south-north
exchanges, and to the recent transition experiences of middle income countries.
In Brazil, constitutional and policy reforms are catching up with need and demands of
society. However, we strongly recommend that grievance address mechanism shall be
set up, which shall work on collective and inter-personal level violence resolutions.
This shall be managed as the civil society and state initiative of negotiations. In
understanding the economics of negotiation, first, we have to acknowledge the conflict
in economics has consequences that are tangible–hence this research prefer to speak of
the Negotiation; the state rather than the novels of the state should be arbiter. Second,
the powers that are mobilized for performance of the negotiations are not transparent,
henceforth negotiation like development has to be seen as long term practice and not
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short term skills in the state. Third, negotiations as practices are closely aligned with
forces of menace because of the combination of obscurity and power. In the end, like
the economic assumption of utility intensification, we shall agree that to engage in
negotiations is to place oneself in a position of vulnerability, hence the negotiation
shall be seen as a subject of study as well as practice of utility intensification.
Negotiation and development are axiomatic belief that between individual and
humanity, on which fringes, the nation exists. Negotiation would naturally dominate
the confederation as well as society, both culturally and economically. Nevertheless
negotiation can be seen as a deterrent to story of exclusion and dispossession in
development debates. The phenomenon of exclusion and marginalization is, still,
an integral aspect of post-colonial capital and it resists being addressed in terms of
the concept of exploitation and appropriation of surplus. Additionally, contrary to
popular conception, economy of underdevelopment and the hegemony of capital is
antithetical to differentiate. In fact the presence of outside capital does not even
signal its weakness, the lack of transformation power. Rather, it is internal continued
persisting of need economy based on structure such as prejudice in education, media
and dearth. Negotiations are, indeed, a sustainable goal of development which must
be constructed equally by the civil society and state.
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Table A.1: Extended summary of Data and Sources
Variables Description Source Abbreviation
X Coordinates longitude IPEA Geodata xcoord
Y Coordinates latitude IPEA Geodata ycoord
State ID state id for 27 states IPEA Geodata id
Year year for 2004-2014 time
Violence attempted
murders+murders
CPT violence
Escalation threatened with eviction+
expulsion+death threats
+ murders
CPT escalation
Incidences number of conflicts
+number of displacement
CPT incidences
Dislocation And Dispossession families driven
out+evicted+destroyed
houses+ rocas+
goods+banditry
CPT dislocation
&
dispossession
Number of Families number of families in
incidences
CPT families
Area area under disputes or
conflicts
CPT area
Overall GINI overall gini PNAD the
overall
Gini
GINI within groups within group GINI PNAD Within
(YP,YR )
GINI between groups between group gini PNAD Between(YP,YR)
Polarization index 1 Silber et al. index PNAD P1
Polarization index 2 Wolfson index PNAD P2
polarization index 3 Zhang & Kanbur index PNAD P3
Average Land Prices average land price FNP av land
price
Minimum Land Prices minimum land price FNP min land
price
Maximum Land Prices maximum land price FNP max land
price
St. Deviation of Land Prices st.dv. In land prices FNP stdv land
price
Urbanization urbanization rate PNAD urban
Agrarian labor agriculture dependence PNAD agriculture
Industrial labor industrial dependence PNAD industrial
Service labor service dependence PNAD servicos
Macro region macro-regions IPEA Geodata regiao
142
Table A.2: Difference between GINI indices
Index Estimate Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
GINI Dis1 0.176012 0.007404 23.7732 0 0.1614352 0.190589
GINI Dis2 0.1831893 0.007023 26.0849 0 0.1693627 0.197016
diff. 0.0071773 0.002463 2.91417 0.0039 0.0023283 0.012026
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Table A.4: Preliminary Models
VARIABLES Model PA Model RE Model FE Model BE
p1 299.3 23.41 1067 -622
-418.8 -420.9 -813 -827.8
p2 3.23 -80.15 258.5 618.3
-200.1 -224.5 -356.9 -501.6
p3 20.39 80.13 -163.7 -37.87
-122.8 -136.3 -206 -308.2
withinypyr 1265 862.8 2,488* 663.1
-822.6 -861.2 -1457 -1620
betweenypyr -742.3 -313.4 -2003 414.8
-767.5 -792.8 -1384 -1216
theoverallgini -380 -417.2 -358.9 -1,572*
-424.9 -472 -699.9 -873.4
Families 0.00704*** 0.00700*** 0.00730*** 0.00504**
-0.000698 -0.000817 -0.001 -0.00187
Dislocation-dispossession -0.00421** -0.00447** -0.00491* 0.00142
-0.00189 -0.00216 -0.00277 -0.00548
Escalation 0.00591* 0.00823** 0.00401 0.013
-0.00303 -0.00362 -0.00414 -0.00989
Violence 0.238 0.234 0.233 -0.587
-0.547 -0.64 -0.776 -1.583
Land price -0.000247 -0.00043 -0.000532 -0.00234
-0.00158 -0.00158 -0.00301 -0.00283
Constant 81.5 29.58 305.1 596.7
-319.3 -359.7 -506.3 -639.6
Observations 88 88 88 88
Number of id 26 26 26 26
R-squared 0.694 0.902
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6: Predicted Values
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Poisson Regression
yhat 88 4.329566 0.450385 3.629261 5.436352
incidences 262 67.87023 62.56894 3 381
Negative Regression
yhatnb 88 3.371992 0.430607 2.787484 4.562351
incidences 262 67.87023 62.56894 3 381
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